Eastern Illinois University

The Keep
Masters Theses

Student Theses & Publications

2004

U.S./NATO Relations After 9/11: U.S.
Contributions to NATO Missions
David E. Heinz
Eastern Illinois University

This research is a product of the graduate program in Political Science at Eastern Illinois University. Find out
more about the program.

Recommended Citation
Heinz, David E., "U.S./NATO Relations After 9/11: U.S. Contributions to NATO Missions" (2004). Masters Theses. 1340.
https://thekeep.eiu.edu/theses/1340

This is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Theses & Publications at The Keep. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses
by an authorized administrator of The Keep. For more information, please contact tabruns@eiu.edu.

I

Pagel ot l

,.EIUGrad School

THESIS REPRODUCTION CERTIFICATE
TO: Graduate Degree Candidates (who have written formal theses)

SUBJECT: Permission to Reproduce Theses

The University Library is receiving a number of request from other institutions asking permission to reproduce
dissertations for inclusion in their library holdings. Although no copyright laws are involved, we feel that
professional courtesy demands that permission be obtained from the author before we allow these to be copied.

PLEASE SIGN ONE OF THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS:
Booth Library of Eastern Illinois University has my permission to lend my thesis to a reputable college or
university for the purpose of copying it for inclusion in that institution's library or research holdings.

Author's Signature

Date

I respectfully request Booth Library of Eastern Illinois University NOT allow my thesis to be reproduced because:
./

Author's Signature

This form must be submitted in duplicate.

Date

u.s./NATO RELATIONS AFTER 9/11:
U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS TO NATO MISSIONS
(TITLE)

BY

David E. Heinz

THESIS
SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF

Master of Arts--Political Science
IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL, EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY
CHARLESTON, ILLINOIS

2004
YEAR

I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THIS THESIS BE ACCEPTED AS FULFILLING
THIS PART OF THE GRADUATE DEGREE CITED ABOVE

DATE

I

I

Acknowledgments

I would like to acknowledge Dr. Lilian A. Barria and Dr. David Carwell for their
guidance and suggestions during the completion of this project. I would like to give
special thanks to Dr. Ryan C. Hendrickson. Without his help and guidance this project
would have never been completed, thank you Dr. Hendrickson for giving me your
unwavering support. I would also like to give a special thanks to Dr. Steven D. Roper,
because without your support and confidence in me, this would not have been possible.

1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction ....................................................................................... 4-7
Chapter I (Literature Review) ................................................................... 8-29
Chapter II (KFOR) ............................................................................. 30-51
Chapter III (ISAF) ............................................................................. 52-72
Chapter IV (NTIM-I) .......................................................................... 73-88
Chapter V (Conclusion) ...................................................................... 89-100
Notes .......................................................................................... 101-107
Bibliography.................................................................................. 108-119
Appendix ..................................................................................... 120-121

2

Abstract: Since the end of the Cold War, the future of NATO has been discussed
amongst scholars. Critics argue that NATO is no longer relevant, while proponents argue
that is still has a viable function in the international community. This thesis asks the
question, what the United States contributes to NATO missions and what does this mean
to NATO's future. This thesis examines NATO mission in Kosovo, Afghanistan and
Iraq, looking at the background of the mission, how and why it was created and how has
the mission evolved. The evidence suggests that since September 11, 2001, the United
States has been retreating from the alliance. The evidence also suggests that without the
contributions of the United States (politically, economically and militarily) the alliance as
a viable institution is in dire straits.
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INTRODUCTION
On April 3, 1949, ten Western European countries, the United States and Canada
signed the Washington Treaty creating NAT0. 1

The purpose of this alliance was

specifically stated in the Washington Treaty, more specifically through Article 5, which
states "an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be
considered an attack against all of them." 2 From 1949 until the late 1980s, this North
Atlantic alliance deterred potential attacks from the Soviet Union and its satellite states.
Beginning in the early 1990s however, NATO's future came into question without the
presence of the Soviet Union.

Yet NATO was able to develop new missions and

capabilities that allowed the alliance to evolve within the "new" Europe.

With the

subsequent NATO missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo it appeared that the
alliance had evolved into a new alliance and its new Strategic Concept adopted in 1991
appeared to be the right course of action for the alliance to remain vital to European
security in the 21st Century.
On September 11, 2001 however, the security of the world changed with the
terrorist

attack~

in New York City and Washington D.C., as did U.S. foreign policy.

Critics and proponents of NATO saw the attacks of September 11th in different ways.
Critics saw the subsequent military actions that were dominated by the United States in
Afghanistan as a demonstration of NATO's fading efficacy.

Proponents saw the

enactment of Article 5 and NATO coming to the United States' defense as a sign of
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continuing vitality of the alliance m the Post-Cold War/Post-September 11th
environment. 3
Most of the literature since the Cold War's end pertaining to alliance formation,
more specifically to NATO itself, has dealt mostly with either its imminent demise or its
future prosperity. Much of this recent literature has dealt with the lack of an "external
threat," which leads directly to the question of NATO's future and its relevance. This
thesis will depart from this traditional literature and look more directly at NATO in terms
of U.S. foreign policy towards NATO and more specifically the United States'
contributions to the alliance militarily and operationally. The fundamental question to be
addressed in this research is what NATO's future is, focusing primarily on what
operational and military contributions the United States makes within the alliance, given
its leadership position over the past 55 years. This research will take a much different
approach than past scholars by looking directly at operational and military contributions
to NATO and its impact on the future of the alliance after September 11th. NATO has
long been a mechanism for a U.S. leadership role in European security. In the postSeptember 11th environment, where terrorism has become the "external threat" to NATO
members, it is increasingly important to the security of both Europe and the United States
to understand NATO's future in light of the many critics who question its relevance
today. Ultimately, this thesis examines the direction the U.S. has taken in its operational
and military contributions towards NATO in the post-9/11 environment and what these
contributions suggest about its future viability.
The literature that pertains to the future prosperity of NATO fits generally into
two fundamental arguments; those that believe NATO is no longer relevant and those that
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believe it is. These arguments can be placed chronologically into three different periods.
The first scholars are very critical of NATO's future arguing that the alliance has seen
better days and will soon meet its demise. These scholars were loudest in the early 1990s
soon after the fall of the Soviet block. In the subsequent years, after NATO adopted a
new Strategic Concept and expanded its membership for the first time since the end of
the Cold War, these scholars began to quiet. 4 At this time other scholars began to argue
that because NATO was able to evolve in the new international environment it would be
able to continue as an important vehicle for European security. However, the scholars
that believed that NATO is no longer relevant have once again resurfaced after the
alliance's problems in Afghanistan, Kosovo and Iraq. This thesis is important because
now more than ever the future of the alliance is being questioned.

The literature

pertaining to NATO's evolution as well as the literature calling for its complete collapse
will be tested through three case studies explained below. Essentially, these cases will
examine how the U.S. worked within the NATO structure to accomplish these missions.
Three case studies will be examined to help shed some light on the U.S./NATO
relationship in the post-September 11th environment. The first case will examine U.S.
operational and military contributions towards the mission in Kosovo, including
Operation Allied Force and Operation Joint Guardian (KFOR). The second case will
examine NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which has been set up
in Afghanistan as a peacekeeping organization. Furthermore, this chapter will include a
discussion of the "collective defense" initiative of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty
(NATO's first implementation of the Article in its history). The third case will examine
NATO's training operation in Iraq, which will include a discussion of the relationship
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between the United States and its NATO allies during the conflict.

Each case will

examine America's foreign policy approach towards each NATO mission in three
categories that will help enrich the argument of the alliance's future.

These three

categories include the early planning stages of the operation (U.S. relations with it NATO
allies), the initial establishment of the military operation itself (including the
organizational, financial and logistical aspects of the operation), and finally the political
evolution of the operation.
The thesis begins with a literature review and discussion of the methodological
approach that will be used in chapter one.

Chapters two, three and four will be an

examination of the cases, and chapter five will consist of a discussion of the findings and
a conclusion to this research question. The research method that will be applied to this
research is a comparative case study of the three aforementioned NATO missions to
identify if political patterns exist that is relevant to the viability of the alliance.
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CHAPTER I
LITERATURE REVIEW

LITERATURE REVIEW:

Most of the literature pertaining to the U.S./NATO relationship deals with the
U.S.'s hegemonic power and how the United States uses this power not only as a security
blanket in Europe, but also to balance the power within Europe.
The literature pertaining to NATO's overall future can generally be summarized
in two distinct arguments covering three chronological waves. The first wave began in
the early 1990s when many scholars argued that NATO had met its demise and that it
should disband altogether. Without the external threat of the Soviet Union, these scholars
predicted that NATO would either fall apart or become basically the shell of a fledgling
alliance. The second wave began around the time of the first round of NATO expansion,
where proponents of NATO began to argue that the institutionalization of NATO had
allowed it to persevere. 5 However, more recently since the terrorist events of September
11, 2001, and subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, critics have once again began to
argue that NATO is no more than a "shell" of its former self and its demise is inevitable.
This newest literature pertaining to the future of NATO argues that even if NATO
continues to exist, it will be only the shell of a former alliance that will undermine its
credibility. 6 What follows in this literature review are the two competing arguments of
NATO's ultimate future.
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FIRST WAVE-The Fall of the Soviet Union
Beginning in the early 1990s, shortly after the Soviet Union's fall, NATO no
longer had a common external threat. Therefore, according to some alliance theorists,
without a common threat, a defense alliance will soon thereafter break-up.

More

generally, because there is no longer an external threat, member countries of an alliance
will begin to distrust each other, which will eventually lead to its downfall. 7 Along this
same line, Mearsheimer took a pessimistic view of Europe after the Cold War, a view
that is set to the beat of an even more imminent threat in Europe because of the Cold
War's end. According to Mearsheimer, if NATO were to "persist on paper, but cease to
function as an alliance," a new multipolar Europe would arise leaving no superpower in
the region to act as an arbitrating force. 8 Because no superpower remains, Europe would
once again become unstable because of the lack of nonproliferation and security
guarantee that NATO provides. For instance, in a bipolar system there are two major
powers that dominate the region and the minor powers know their place and have less of
an influence within the system.
A mutlipolar system however, has three or more major powers that dominate and
the smaller minor powers have considerable flexibility when it comes to alliance
formation or even remaining neutral. Therefore, according to Mearsheimer, with the
imbalance of powers in Europe since the Cold War's end there is no longer a bipolar
world. Instead a multipolar world exists which gives smaller powers the opportunity to
defect. In a multipolar world, deterrence is much more difficult to maintain which can
lead directly to the possibility of conflict. In other words according to realist scholars, an
alliance will not outlive the end of threats that they were created to prevent. Without
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these threats, there is no reason for alliance members to cooperate, especially if decisionmaking becomes much more difficult to obtain. 9
Morgenthau adds that alliances are a necessary function for the balance of power
in a multiple-state system, and when common interests are tentative in terms of policy, a
treaty of alliance is required to make them precise and effective. Generally, Morgenthau
argues, alliances are temporary in duration and are most prevalent during wartime. 10
Furthermore, Mearsheimer argued that the Soviet Union was the glue that held NATO
together, and in its absence, the United States would likely abandon the European
continent all together, bringing an end to NAT0. 11
Within this same school of thought, Walt's balance-of-power theory of alliance
formation provides another explanation for NATO's role in Western European security
since the beginning of the Cold War. According to balance of power theory, states form
alliances because they do not want others to achieve a dominant position in the
international system. Balance-of-power theory predicts that a decline in the Soviet threat
will lead NATO to devote less effort to deterring a direct military challenge, alliance
cohesion will decline, and bargaining within the alliance will become more intense. He
argues that if the alliance lacks an external threat to deter, a decrease in alliance cohesion
is likely. However, Walt argues that NATO has been able to increase the stability of the
alliance due to its institutionalization, and that NATO is still a valuable feature to
. 12
Western European security.
In 1991, soon after the fall of the Soviet Union and the subsequent doubts of
NATO's future, Walker argued that NATO would become virtually irrelevant to prevent
the possibility of violence erupting in the European region. Walker argued that NATO
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would likely be unable to take action in out-of-area conflicts because the U.S. would be
unable to gain a consensus from its European allies. Furthermore, Walker argues that the
expansion of NATO to include Eastern European countries would further destabilize the
region by isolating the Russians. This expansion eastward in tum would make Europe
less secure. 13 Critics of a post-Cold War NATO argue that the biggest challenge that the
alliance faces is the differences of attitudes between Europeans and Americans in terms
of global issues, including global security and out-of-area operations.
Duffield argues that contrary to the expectation that NATO would become
dormant at the end of the Cold War, it remains the leading security organization in
Europe. NATO has not only survived in the post-Cold War environment, but has added
to its organizational bodies and has undertaken new activities and missions.

He

maintains that realist theorists who argued that NATO would become obsolete have
overlooked three important factors that have helped ensure NATO's future. First, they
underestimated the number of sufficient external threats that justify the preservation of
the alliance.

Second, they failed to consider NATO' s capacity for institutional

adaptation. Finally, they overlooked the intra-alliance functions that the alliance has
always performed even during the Cold War.

These functions would include the

stabilization of Western Europe by ensuring that past rival states would not war with each
other. 14
Furthermore, Glaser argues that NATO continues to play an important role in the
security of the European continent. He argues that the new European institutions will not
be up to the tasks that the new post-Cold War environment brings with it. 15 NATO in the
post-Cold War era will play a valuable role in preventing a resurgent Russia from
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appearing, it can be used as a vehicle for providing a security guarantee for Eastern
European countries, and finally it can help ensure against possible security concerns that
could divide the European powers.

Although it is possible that the new European

institutions would be able to provide this security in the region, it is impossible to downplay the importance of the United States on the continent. Without NATO as its vehicle,
it is possible that the United States would retreat from the region which could lead to
instability.

Glaser argues that without a U.S. presence, Western European security

guarantees toward the East against the backdrop of a resurgent Russia would be less
credible. Furthermore, the European Union would be unable to prevent the weakening of
relations between the major European powers. Without NATO, the U.S. could possibly
retreat from the region which would take away its role as a balancing power which in tum
could lead one European power to dominate the region. 16
Four years after the fall of the Soviet block, scholars began to argue that NATO
has been able to remain relevant because it had been able to adapt to the new European
security environment. Holbrooke argues that although NATO's primary purpose is still
collective defense, new goals and programs have been adopted by the alliance to ensure
its relevance. Programs such as the Partnership for Peace, Collective crisis management,
out-of-area operations have all been adopted by the alliance. 17 These new programs have
already begun to build a new sense of security in the region even before the alliance
expanded.

Even though the primary security threat to NATO has collapsed, Kaiser

argues that NATO has been a multipurpose alliance from the start shaping and
developing international politics since the end of the World War II. 18 He asserts that the
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structure of the alliance since its inception remains relevant even today, and has the
potential to shape the alliance for decades to come.
This early literature shows that two arguments have emerged for and against the
future prosperity of the Atlantic Alliance.

It would be simple if the argument stopped

here. By the mid-1990s it was evident that early critics of NATO may have been wrong
in believing that the alliance would perish.
SECOND WAVE-EXPANSI ON?
A second wave of literature beginning in the mid to late 1990s emerged shedding
further light on these two competing arguments. This second wave of literature began to
emerge about the time that the alliance expanded to include Poland, Hungary and the
Czech Republic. Critics and proponents alike saw the expansion of the alliance eastward
to include former Soviet block countries as the turning point in the future of the alliance.
Wyllie argued that NATO's expansion weakens an already fragile alliance. This
new NATO is loaded with problems that further weaken the alliance.

The first and

second round of expansion have made decision-making more difficult because consensus
is much more difficult to achieve when there are so many members. The difficulty of
gaining a consensus is especially true when a policy objective is supported by the larger
powers within the alliance but not the smaller less "relevant" partners.

Another

consequence of NATO enlargement that Wyllie identifies is the transformation from a
collective defense alliance to a collective security alliance. As the alliance grows, the
area which it must cover also grows. 19 Maybe even more debilitating is that NATO may
take on more and more of a likeness to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
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Europe (OSCE). This transformation will likely diminish the power of the United States
as a leader within the alliance.
On the other hand, Lepgold contends that the expanded alliance's new
governments will be able to provide the necessary forces to carry out NATO's new
missions. 20 Many proponents of NATO enlargement have argued that the inclusion of
former Soviet satellite states will make it easier to spread democracy throughout the
region.

Contrary to this assertion, Reiter asserts that NATO is not a vehicle for

democracy because of its checkered past. During the Cold War, when the alliance was a
deterrent of Soviet aggression, some states flipped back and forth between autocratic
governments and democratic governments. If NATO never pushed for democratization
during the Cold War, how are we to believe that it will in the post-Cold War era where
there is no external threat?

Furthermore, Reiter argues that the costs of NATO

enlargement are immense to both aspiring states and current members. He argues that the
cost of enlargement and the deterioration of NATO/Russian relations should encourage
NATO to abandon any further expansion. 21

To further the critics' case against the

prospects of a viable alliance in the future, Smith and Timmins assert that neither NATO
nor the European Union (EU) have the resolve or the resources to provide for the security
of Europe by itself. They contend that NATO and the EU must develop a cooperative
and long-term relationship with each other if they want to secure the region. 22
Brown maintained that three distinct arguments came out of the collapse of the
Soviet Union.

First, the Russians favored abolishing the Warsaw Pact and NATO

altogether. Second, some assert that NATO was still needed, but primacy in decisionmaking should be given to the new European institutions (i.e., the European Union).

14

Finally, others believed that America's engagement in the European theater was still vital
to the security of the European region. In other words, NATO was a way to keep the
United States in the region. In the end this final argument won and it was apparent that
NATO remained the primary security organization in Europe.

Brown however

challenges that because NATO had to change its mission from a strategy of deterrence to
a new strategy that would maintain the peace in the region, that the alliance would
become ineffective and would undermine its credibility and durability. 23
Brown takes a pessimistic view of the "new" NATO, and contends that the new
Strategic Concept that was unveiled at the 1991 Rome Summit is not the correct strategy
for NATO to take if it wants to continue as a viable alliance. 24 Brown asserts that
NATO, and especially the United States, must maintain their original strategy of
collective self-defense if it wants to continue to be relevant.

The new missions he

believes are highly problematic and dangerous and could undermine the alliance as a
whole and eventually lead to its demise. Furthermore, Brown asserts that the best way to
keep the United States engaged in European affairs and security is to emphasize the
importance of both American and European interests that are at stake. This minimalist
strategy emphasizes the vital interests, security concerns and the low costs of military
intervention as the core strategy that NATO should conform to. Unlike Morgenthau,
Waltz and Mearsheimer, Brown challenges the argument that NATO is not longer
relevant, and asserts that NATO is still of vital importance to the security of Europe
because it acts as a vehicle for the United States to remain engaged in Europe. However,
he believes that this can only be accomplished through the development of a new
strategy. The stability of Europe is still important because the U.S. maintains a balance
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of power amongst Europe's larger states. This minimalist strategy Brown argues, could
sustain NATO for decades to come. Globalizing and expanding the scope of NATO on
the other hand will without a doubt lead to its demise. 25
At the opposite end of the spectrum, Wallander argued that NATO's institutional
assets have allowed NATO to adapt to a changing global environment. Wallander asserts
that NATO's high degree of institutionalization is the central explanatory factor of why
NATO has remained a viable alliance. These institutional assets allow states to cooperate
by providing information on intentions, establishing rules for negotiations, decisionmaking, implementation, and by creating incentives for member states to conform to
international standards for multilateral action. The core institutional assets of NATO
were general in nature and were not restricted to external threats. Because of these
assets, NATO has grown from a basic political commitment to an "elaborate politicalmilitary institution" over the course of its history. NATO's daily political practices
allowed it to adapt to post-Cold War security, as was seen during the events in Bosnia.
During the Cold War, NATO was able to develop these general assets to deal with the
Soviet threat, but NATO also developed practices and procedures that fostered
integration amongst its members to deal with European security issues beyond that of the
Soviet Union. It is because of these assets that NATO continues to be an effective
political-military alliance. Some of the new assets that have emerged are the Partnership
for Peace, which allows aspiring members to work with NATO in operations to gain
inter-operatability. Also created was the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC),
which allows Russia to sit in on NATO meetings and gives them a veto on NATO
operations. Through these assets NATO has incorporated nonmembers into virtually all
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its practices except for those involving Article 5. These assets were not created because
of the end of the Cold War, but instead were built on the procedures and practices that
NATO developed during the Cold War. 26
Others, such as Wallander and Kay, have made attempts at policy
recommendations that would help ensure the feasibility of NATO's future. Kay argues
that it is in the United States best interest to use NATO expansion as a catalyst to demand
reforms that would make NATO relevant in the 21st Century.

Integrating new

democracies into NATO could act as a powerful force in maintaining stability in Central
and Eastern Europe. If the United States is unable to do this, Kay argues that it could be
NATO's "last gasp" for its future.

He cautions that NATO expansion could exacerbate

the problem of consensus building within the alliance, because it would now take all 26
states to ratify a policy before it could be implemented. The inability of the alliance to
come to a consensus was seen during the United States' plea to go to war with Iraq when
Germany and France abstained from the decision. It is also evident that new member
states are not prepared to bare the burden of NATO membership, as was seen in Kosovo
in 1999 and Afghanistan in 2001.

Only the United States and Great Britain were

prepared to project modem military power.

Furthermore, Afghanistan showed that

although NATO is growing, its deterrent functions, military capabilities, and political
effectiveness are diminishing. 27
Kay contends that this "new" Europe will likely lead the United States to project
military power in the world unilaterally, which will be seen in the case of the war in Iraq.
At the same time, European powers may try to confine U.S. strength by strengthening the
European Union as an alternative vehicle for future European security policies. 28
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Wallander makes the argument that NATO members must agree to amend the North
Atlantic Treaty to allow for sanctions, suspension, or even expulsion of backsliding
members.

Currently there is nothing in the treaty that punishes members for not

providing the commitments that they promised. If this is not addressed, NATO will
ultimately decline into irrelevance. For NATO to remain strong, Wallander argues that
membership criteria must be maintained amongst both aspirant countries and member
countries. 29
If there is one theme that can be drawn from the literature dealing with the future

of the Atlantic alliance is that critics argue that a new policy development within the
alliance will lead to its demise, while proponents argue that the same development shows
the alliance's relevance. For example while proponents of NATO have argued that the
peacekeeping mission in Kosovo was a success and a guiding light to the future
prosperity of the alliance, critics have used the same crisis to argue that NATO has met
its demise. Expansion is another aspect of the alliance that both critics and proponents
examine. Proponents maintain that expansion will extend NATO's sphere of influence
and bring democracy to former Soviet satellite states, while critics believe that consensus
is too difficult to obtain with so many members.

Critics also contend that the new

alliance partners cannot meet NATO standards in terms of their military readiness and
contributions.

Furthermore, these same critics assert that while NATO may bring

democracy to these states there is nothing in the NATO Charter that prevents them from
falling back into authoritarianism.
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THIRD WAVE-POST-SEPTEMBER 11 TH

On the morning of Tuesday, September 11, 2001 the worst terrorist attacks on
U.S. soil occurred. These events dramatically altered the sense of security in the United
States as well as the rest of the world. While the Bush administration began to reevaluate
its foreign policy, the U.S.'s NATO allies rallied behind them. For the first time in its 55
year history NATO invoked Article 5, the collective self-defense clause of the
Washington Treaty. This event and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq led to
the formation of a third wave of literature.
As seen in the first two waves, two divergent arguments emerged. Once again in
the third wave a common theme can be seen as proponents and critics alike saw these
crises as both an opportunity and a revelation. Proponents of NATO saw these events
and the subsequent actions of both the United States and its allies as an opportunity for
the alliance to further evolve in the new global security realm. This evolution depended
on the alliance partners developing a new sustainable relationship that revolves around
the notion that the alliance is a chosen partnership and not a necessary one. However,
both critics and proponents alike contend that an agreement of this magnitude will be a
difficult task for one major reason, the U.S. global vision vs. the European global vision.
The most important reason that scholars agree upon is the divergent view of the world by
the United States and their alliance partners. The new European vision of a new world
order has pointed towards a pluralistic world where the U.S. would be balanced by
regionally located powers. At the same time, the United State vision of a new world
order is unipolar and unilateral in nature with the U.S. as the lone hegemonic power.
These two divergent views of the new world no doubt have a great potential for conflict.
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One of the harsher critics of NATO today is Meyer. He asserts that NATO's time has
come and gone and there is no legitimate reason for it to continue to exist. He argues that
for both the U.S. and Europeans, NATO is at "best a distraction and at worst toxic to their
respective contemporary security needs. 30 Meyer goes as far as to say that the U.S. used
the war in Kosovo and NATO's expansion as reasons to explain NATO's future viability.
Accordingly, he believes that there are five reasons why NATO is no longer
needed in the post-Cold War period.

First, as has been suggested previously in this

literature review, the only legitimate threat that justified NATO's existence is gone.
Since the fall of the Soviet Union there is no longer an external threat to the security of
the ally countries.

However, proponents of expansion argue that because of the

institutionalization of NATO, the lack of a common external threat is no longer needed
because the alliance as an institution is able to adapt to the changing global
environment. 31 Second, the "new" Europe that has evolved since the end of the Cold
War has changed so much that it has outgrown NATO. The evolution of the European
Union and the OSCE has made NATO obsolete. However, proponents argue that the EU
and OSCE do not have sufficient military resources to handle any crisis that may arise in
the region.

European and U.S. leaders alike argue that the EU is not a sufficient

alternative to the Atlantic partnership.
Third, NATO (and more importantly the Russian/NATO partnership) has become
less important to the security of Russia. The bickering between the U.S. and its NATO
allies over Iraq has convinced Russia to keep the alliance at arms length, especially now
that the inclusion of the Baltic States in NATO is very much a done-issue. On the other
hand proponents argue that the NATO/Russian partnership is imperative to prevent the
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resurgence of Russia as a super-power in the region. Fourth, expansion hinders more
than it helps the current alliance members. Since many of these nations have neither the
economy nor the military to legitimately participate in NATO operations, it renders them
largely obsolete. While proponents argue that expansion protects the countries of Central
and Eastern Europe from an external threat, Meyer argues that no such threat exists
rendering this argument irrelevant.

Proponents attempt to further their argument for

expansion by arguing that NATO would help to spread democracy throughout the region.
Meyer and other critics argue that NATO has never advanced democracy. Finally, since
the end of the Cold War, NATO's programs and instruments have expanded
exponentially. Every summit that NATO has had since the fall of Soviet communism has
been concerned with how to reinvent NATO in an effort to make NATO relevant again. 32
Proponents of NATO argue that NATO's institutionalization during the Cold War has
allowed it to evolve, not reinvent, into a viable security organization in the European
region. 33
Calleo contended that the future of the alliance depends greatly on the ability of
the United States and Europe to find some way of accommodating each other so Europe
can continue its integration to the point that the West can once again balance each other
out. He believes that the European Union must develop into a cohesive body that is able
to hold its own in this balancing act. 34 Proponents of NATO have pointed to the success
of the war in Afghanistan to show the viability of the alliance. Lansford asserts that the
declaration of Article 5, and the subsequent allies coming to the aide of America, shows
that the alliance is still a viable security organization in the global community. He adds
that the alliance partners coming to the United States' aide after the terrorist attacks,
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shows that NATO can go out of area and NATO's new strategic concept enabled the
United States to pick and choose parts of the alliance that were important to the
mission. 35 Critics however look at how the United States used the alliance after the
terrorist attacks in a different way.

They contend that the United States acted as a

hegemonic power, and that the large defense gap that exists between the United States
and its allied partners enabled the United States to manipulate the alliance to further its
own agenda.
Another question that is beginning to be debated focuses on NATO's purpose in
the post-September 11th environment. Forster and Wallace contend that the enlargement
of the EU and its expanded capabilities may lead it to displace NATO as a forum for
negotiating the Atlantic partnership. However, NATO as a security organization, they
argue, will continue to persist on many levels. First, they mention that the EU is not the
proper forum to shape policy in response to international terrorism and because of this
NATO is left as the primary security organization for both European and American
policy makers in the fight against global terrorism. Second, NATO gives the United
States a privileged position within Europe which could help shape the EU-U.S. economic
relationship. Finally, they argue that NATO is a viable vehicle in extending the security
of the European region eastward. These three, the authors argue, should keep the alliance
in business for years to come. 36
Thomson on the other hand argues that the divergence of strategic perspectives
between the United States and Europe may be too large to overcome. First, in terms of
vital interests, Europe is a regional power today, not a global one like the United States,
which leads many European leaders to believe that there are no vital interests outside of
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the European region. Second, the Europeans do not feel the same imminent threat that
Americans do when it comes to terrorism. Finally, what Thomson argues is the largest
divergence, is the differences between European and American strategy in terms of the
role of military force. 37 While the United States has shifted its focus away from threats
from the Soviet Union to terrorism, Europeans believe that these threats have
disappeared.
Along this same argument, Daalder argues that the difference between American
and European policy is an important factor in the diminishing relationship of the alliance
partners. He believes that NATO cannot survive the strains that it has experienced over
the past few years. The outcome of the war in Iraq should go a long way in determining
the alliance's future. If the United States and Europeans can agree upon policies to
rebuild a war tom Iraq and policies to stabilize the Middle Eastern region, then the
alliance may be spared.

However, if the United States decides on a policy of

unilateralism, the alliance may be pushed over the edge. Daalder believes the
responsibility of salvaging the transatlantic partnership truly depends on the United
States. 38 Kolko takes even a more pessimistic view of the alliance, arguing that NATO
has already met its demise because of the United States' decision to go to war with Iraq
unilaterally. Kolko stresses that NATO's rationale for its existence ended more than a
decade ago when the Soviet Union collapsed. The United States however continues to
maintain the importance of the alliance to hinder European autonomy, which Kolko
argues was the primary reason for its creation. Today, as the author argues, is more and
more a multipolar world in which NATO no longer has a dominant role in. Therefore,
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that will be measured in this thesis are the NATO missions under examination. The unit
of analysis will be the United States contributions to these missions.
There are a few limitations to the case study method. First, the case study method
has a limited N, which limit the number of instances in which the researcher can examine
their variables. Second, by focusing on a single event it is difficult to use the findings as
a predictor to future cases. This limitation, however, can be strengthened by repetition
(or the study of multiple cases). Finally, the selection of cases can be a weakness. The
researcher must be careful in their selection of cases to ensure that they are relevant to
each other. In this thesis, the cases of Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq have been chosen
because of their relevance to each other. In each case a contingent of NATO troops were
used. Also, these three NATO missions are the most visible missions that NATO has
undertaken in the Post-Cold War era.
Selection of cases

The selection of cases to address the question in this thesis was difficult in the
sense that there are a number of different NATO programs and missions that could have
been selected. However, it is important to answer the question of NATO/United States
relations so the cases must conform to each other so that a relationship can be seen. In
order to answer this question, it is important to the integrity of the research question to
ensure that the cases are compatible. It is important that the cases revolve around the
changes of the global environment in the Post-9/11 era. The three cases chosen are as
follows:
Kosovo:

This case is important because of two fundamental reasons.

First, it is

important because the peacekeeping operation began under a different American
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administration that had a different view of the world. Second, the mission began before
the September 11th attacks and the subsequent change in the United States' foreign policy
direction. Within this mission, the thesis will ask if the United States' relationship with
NATO evolved after the terrorist attacks on the United States.

Furthermore, the

evolution of this mission, in regards to U.S. commitment, help to strengthen the cases of
Afghanistan and Iraq by showing how the United States contributed to alliance missions
before and after 9/11. The mission in Kosovo may be the strongest of the cases under
examination in this thesis because we will be able to see how it evolved from a mission in
the pre-9/11 environment to the post-9/11 environment. Furthermore, as stated earlier,
this is the only mission under examination in which there were two different U.S.
administrations.
Afghanistan: The mission in Afghanistan is vital to this thesis because it shows how the

United States' relationship with NATO evolved from the peacekeeping mission in
Kosovo, after the implementation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. This case is
important because for the first time in its 55 year history, the alliance implemented the
collective self-defense clause. Furthermore, this case shows how and what the alliance
partners contributed to Operation Enduring Freedom. It also examines how and what
alliance partners have and are contributing to the International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF), which has been set up in Afghanistan as a peacekeeping organization. This case
is relevant to this thesis because it was implemented soon after Enduring Freedom, led by
the Unites States, came to an end. Also, this case is significant because it took place after
9/11, meaning that the position and evolution of U.S. leadership can be seen in the new
global environment.
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the United States' continued aspirations to remam the only hegemonic power are
diminishing and unattainable. 39
In the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks on the United States,
NATO's role in the global security realm was hampered by three interconnected
predicaments. First, there was no consensus amongst alliance members on how to deal
with the new threats. Second, the United States felt that the Europeans did not have the
needed capabilities to necessitate going through the alliance deal with new security
threats. Finally, some American leaders saw NATO as too tedious and unmanageable to
subject their policy to it.

They believed that the European states would bog down

policies that must be acted on immediately. 40 Despite these deficiencies, Ruhle notes that
the 2002 Prague Summit showed that working together is still the best option for both
sides of the Atlantic despite their disagreements on issues such as Iraq; and that
agreement amongst the alliance members about NATO's future must remain the policy of
the future.
Maybe Kolko best summed this up by saying that "when the Soviet Union
capsized over a decade ago, NATO's nominal rationale for existence died with it. But
the principal reason for its creation-to forestall European autonomy-remains." He
continues by saying, "there should be no doubt that the Cold War geopolitical legacies
are ending and a new configuration of nations is in the process of being created. Military
triumph, in any case, can scarcely be equated with political success-and it is politics that
counts most in the long run." 41
From these three waves of literature one major trend appears.

Critics and

proponents alike tend to argue that the same "crisis" or the same "developments" are the

24

reasons for either NATO's demise or its continued viability. Most of this literature
concentrates on the alliance as a whole and only the more recent literature deals
specifically with U.S. policy or U.S./NATO relations.
This thesis makes an important departure from the traditional literature, not only
on the transatlantic alliance, but on alliance theory in principle.

This research will

examine the American relationship towards its alliance partners. This thesis is important
today because now more than ever the relevance or viability of the alliance is being
called into question and many scholars believe that U.S. foreign policy since September
11th is the reason why the alliance is so strained.

This thesis will examine NATO's

missions and the United States military and operational contributions towards the alliance
in the Post-September 11th environment.

METHODOLOGY
The method that will be used in this thesis is a comparative case study of the three
Post-September 11th NATO missions.

George contends that a good case study can

contribute to a sound theory in the field of international relations.

By following a

structured, disciplined approach to the cases being examined, the results could be used in
the replication of future investigations. The repetition of the case studies can fit into the
development of theory. 42
The case study approach that will be followed in this thesis is the comparative
method. This type of case study utilizes general variables for the purposes of description
and explanation. This is necessary to permit the comparison and gathering of findings. 43
A major strength of this method is the intensive analysis of specific cases. The constant
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Iraq: The mission in Iraq (Training Implementation Mission) is an important case to
study for the purpose of this thesis because many NATO partners were against the U.S.
led coalition that supplanted Saddam Hussein during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Again,
this case will go a long way in explaining the new complex relationship that exists
between the United States and its European allies. Although this is the newest mission
that NATO has undertaken, it is no doubt of great importance to the future of the alliance
because it shows the relationship between the United States and its NATO allies not only
after 9/11, but maybe more importantly after the U.S. led war in Iraq that was not
supported by many of the major European powers. The mission in Iraq however is also
the weakest of the three cases because the mission is still in its infancy. This mission has
not had time to mature and evolve like the other two NATO missions.
In order to ensure the integrity of the cases, each case will consist of three
sections of examination. Each case will begin with an examination of its background,
then an examination of its creation, and finally a section on its evolution.

Background
This section will explain how the NATO mission was outlined to determine the
strength and goals of the mission. This section will show what alliance partners agreed
upon as the correct course of action to take to make the mission a success. It will also
explain who was put in charge of the mission. This section also explains how NATO, if
at all, became involved in the first place.

Creation
This section will address how many troops from each participating nation
contributed to the mission as well as who was responsible for the setup and
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implementation of the mission. This section will also look at who paid for the mission
and what the United States contributed at its outset, and how the mission was organized.
Evolution

This section will look at how United States' leadership (most importantly
President George W. Bush) approached the particular NATO mission. This section will
also look at how the mission has changed by looking at how many troops the United
States continued to supply to the mission, who was in charge of the mission, as well as
any problems that may have or still may arise. The mission in Iraq will deviate from the
other cases in this section of the study because this mission is just beginning to be
implemented. This could be seen as a weakness of the case study, but I contend that the
development and participation sections will be adequate enough in regards to answering
my research question.
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CHAPTER II
KOSOVO
KFOR
Kosovo lies in southern Serbia and has a mixed population consisting of ethnic
Albanians and a minority population of Serbians. Both Serbian and Albanian nationalists
claim Kosovo to be their own on historical, demographic and military grounds. In the
early 20th Century, this Albanian majority province was conquered by Serbia and
remained a part of Yugoslavia throughout this century. In the 1960s, a movement of
liberation was begun by the ethnic Albanians who predominantly made up the regions
population which resulted in an autonomous Kosovo. Up until 1989, Kosovo enjoyed a
rather high degree of autonomy in the region that made up the former Yugoslavia.
However, when Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic brought the region under direct control
of the Serbian capital Belgrade, the ethnic Albanian population rebelled. This rebellion
led to the conflict between Serbian military and police forces and the ethnic Albanian
forces.

This conflict resulted directly in the death of over 1,500 Albanians and the

displacement of over 400,000 Albanian refugees from the country. 44 At this time the
international community became alarmed that this conflict may escalate into neighboring
countries.
THE BACKGROUND OF KFOR

The Dayton Accords that were signed in December 1995 laid out the boundaries
of the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia. 45 However, the issue of the future of Kosovo was
not included in these accords, and this lead indirectly to the violence that would erupt in
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the region because the ethnic Kosovar Albanians did not get the restoration of their
political rights that they had hoped for following the Dayton Accords. Cordesman asserts
that NATO's use of force against the Bosnian-Serbs in Bosnia only exacerbated the
conflict in Kosovo. After the conflict in Bosnia, many states in the U.N. began to show a
growing resistance to what they perceived as Western attempts to use the U.N. for peacekeeping missions to justify Western intervention.

This concern by the international

community, as well as the creation of a negotiating climate where the use of force was
ultimately required to come to a diplomatic solution to the crisis, indirectly led to
NATO's involvement in Kosovo. 46

Therefore, the conflict in Kosovo began in an

international environment where the international community lacked common priorities.
Since the United Nations was predisposed to take a hands-off approach to peacekeeping
because of its experiences in Bosnia, the conflict in Kosovo went largely undeterred.
President Bill Clinton and his administration agreed that it was the obligation of
the United States to intervene in Kosovo to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe and
evidence shows that this was the correct course of action. The Clinton Administration,
especially Madeline Albright, pushed for air strikes against the Republic of Yugoslavia.
However, the administration refused to consider the introduction of ground troops in
order to force Yugoslav forces out of Kosovo. President Clinton also made it clear that
the United States would participate in any peacekeeping operation if a peace agreement
was reached between the two warring parties. He also reiterated that the United States
would reduce its level of troop commitments when Kosovo's governmental institutions
took hold. 47
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On December 16, 1997 the growing humanitarian crisis in Kosovo was discussed
by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) expressing their concerns over the escalation of
hostilities in the region which could lead to instability in the surrounding countries. 48 At
this meeting, the NAC called upon all concerned parties to find an acceptable solution to
the hostilities. On March 9, 1998 a Contact Group issued a statement condemning the
attacks by the Yugoslav army against the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and called for
the immediate termination of hostilities. 49 Following this statement, the international
community also began to express their concerns over the escalation of hostilities in the
region and on March 31, 1998 the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution
1160 which condemned the use of excessive force by Serbian police forces against
civilians in Kosovo as well as acts of terrorism being carried out by the KLA. This
resolution also called for a complete arms embargo on the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia including the territory of Kosovo. 50

On May 28, 1998 the NAC agreed on

two major objectives dealing specifically with Kosovo. First, they agreed that a peaceful
declaration between the two warring parties must be found.

Second, they agreed to

promote peace and stability in the surrounding region. In September of the same year,
the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1199 that called for a cease fire, the
withdrawal of all Yugoslav forces, access for humanitarian agencies, and the undeterred
return of misplaced refugees to their homes. The next day the NAC met and declared
that if necessary, NATO would take military action against the Yugoslav forces. On
September 28, Milosevic issued a statement declaring victory and announced that
Yugoslav forces would begin to pull out of Kosovo. NATO intelligence reports showed
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otherwise and the United States began to push for the implantation of the two agreed
upon air operations against Yugoslav forces. 51
Because of the lack of unity in the United Nations, leaders of NATO nations
began to realize that the burden to end hostilities in Kosovo would fall upon them. The
decision to use force against the Yugoslav forces in Kosovo faced opposition in both
NATO and the U.N. on legal grounds. The United States and Great Britain used U.N.
Resolutions 1160 and 1199 as their argument that the use of force was necessary. The
violation of Yugoslav forces of these two resolutions meant that they were in direct
violation of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which provided sufficient grounds for the
use of force.

German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel rejected this argument on the

grounds that both Russia and China introduced statements spelling out that the two
resolutions did not authorize the use of force. Kinkel instead made that argument that it
is not the resolutions, but the very fact that the U.N. Security Council was unable to act in
an emergency situation and their inability to pass a resolution authorizing the use of force
was the reason that NATO should act. 52
In the end NATO Secretary General Javier Solana relied on four reasons to justify
the use of force. First, Yugoslav forces failed to recognize or fulfill the requirements
stated in U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1160 or 1199. Second, Solana was troubled
by the possibility of an imminent humanitarian tragedy.

Third, Solana agreed with

Kinkel's argument that the U.N. was unable to obtain a short order resolution authorizing
the use of force. Finally, the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo compromised the
peace and security of the region and NATO decided to act. Solana justified NATO's
actions by pointing out that Milosevic had refused to accept the peace negotiations laid
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out in the Rambouillet Accords. s3

In the fall of 1998, the violence and hostilities

continued to escalate despite the concerns and actions of the U.N. and NATO.

On

August 12, 1998 NATO Secretary General Javier Solana issued a statement blaming
Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic for the continuing violence in Kosovo and stated
that the NAC had already reviewed a range of operations and plans to bring the violence
to an end. While it appeared on the surface the President Milosevic may have been
heeding to the threats of NATO, under the surface the Yugoslav Army continued its
aggression towards the ethnic Albanians. After Milosevic declared that the KLA had
been defeated on September 28 and Yugoslav forces would be withdrawing from the
area, nineteen Albanians were found massacred the next day. Thus, Solana argued, the
use of force was the only way that the international community could "prevent more
human suffering and repression and violence against the civilian population of
Kosovo."s 4
Days later, what came to be known as the October Crisis took place where
Solana informed the international community that NATO had made plans in direct
preparation of air strikes over Yugoslavia.

On October 12, U.S. National Security

Advisor Sandy Berger announced that NATO was ready to conduct the air strikes to
assure that Milosevic would comply with NATO and U.N. demands. The next day it
appeared that Milosevic would heed to the demands of NATO when he, Solana, and
Supreme Allied Commander General Wesley Clark signed an agreement allowing for the
aerial surveillance of the region as well as the creation of the Kosovo Verification
Mission, led by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which
allowed for unarmed observers to monitor the situation in Kosovo.ss
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The October Crisis that led to the Kosovo Verification Mission alerted the
international community to the violence and oppression that the ethnic Albanians had
faced from Yugoslav forces.

More importantly, however, a mistake was made in

believing that Milosevic would back down when threatened by air strikes from NATO.
Despite the warnings towards Yugoslav forces, the oppression and violence against the
ethnic Albanians continued. While the actions of NATO and the implementation of the
OSCE verification mission resulted in a period of peace, the fighting between the Serbs
and Koso vars flared up once again in 1999.
The continuous violence in the Kosovo region came to a head on January 15,
1999 when approximately forty-five Albanians were killed at Racak. The following day,
the NAC demanded that those responsible for the attacks be brought to justice and once
again threatened air strikes against Yugoslav forces. On January 28, NATO issued a
warning to both Milosevic and the KLA leadership indicating that NATO fully supported
the political settlement that was agreed upon under the adjudication of the Contact Group
(March 9, 1998). This agreement included the preservation of the territorial integrity of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the protection of human rights against all ethnic
groups. Milosevic, once again was not alarmed by these threats and on February 16,
1999 announced that he would not allow foreign troops into the region. The following
day, Solana announced that NATO would be willing to lead a peacekeeping force in
Kosovo and would take any actions necessary to ensure that a humanitarian catastrophe
did not occur. 56
During the year of 1998, some 1500 Kosovar Albanians lost their lives, while
another 400,000 were forced from their homes. Concerned about a further escalation of
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the violence in the region, the humanitarian costs and the risk that it could spread to
neighboring countries led the international community, most notably NATO, to act.
After months of speculation that Milosevic would address the growing concerns of the
international community, along with the arms embargo that was implemented in U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1190 and subsequent NATO threats of air strikes, it became
obvious that Milosevic did not take these threats seriously. These factors, along with the
growing hostilities that the Serbians continued to press upon the ethnic Albanians, led to
the implementation of Operation Allied Force on March 24, 1999.
On April 12, 1999, during Operation Allied Force, NATO's objectives to deal
with the crisis in Kosovo were reiterated in a statement issued at the Extraordinary
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council and were reaffirmed by leaders of alliance
countries in Washington D.C. on April 23, 1999. Five objectives were adopted at this
meeting. First, Serbian forces must cease all military actions in the region as well as an
end to the violence and oppression of Kosovar Albanians. Second, Serbian forces must
withdraw military, police and paramilitary forces from Kosovo. Third, was to create an
international military force that would be present within Kosovo to ensure that the first
and second objectives were being carried out. Fourth, refugees and displaced persons
would be returned safely to their homes and their access to humanitarian aid would go
unimpeded. Finally, the alliance wanted the establishment of a political infrastructure in
accord with the Rambouillet Accords, international laws and the Charter of the United
Nations. 57 Because the United Nations lacked both unity and willingness to use force in
Kosovo to stop the humanitarian catastrophe, the burden fell on NATO.
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On March 24, 1999, after numerous diplomatic efforts that failed to convince
Milosevic to end the conflict, Operation Allied Force commenced, beginning the air
campaign in Kosovo. For the next seventy-eight days, NATO aircrafts struck strategic
Serbian air defenses as well as Serbian strongholds. During the 38,000 sorties flown in
support of Operation Allied Force there was not a single allied fatality. The NATO allies
began these strikes under the assumption that it would take as little as twelve days to
bring Milosevic and the Serbian forces to the bargaining table. 58 The U.S. Department of
Defense had this assessment of the air strikes:
"As the peace talks broke down, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe
directed that a new option separate from previous plans be developed.
This option was envisioned to be a 2-day strike, hitting targets throughout
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in an attempt to convince Milosevic to
withdraw his forces and cease hostilities .... The limited 2-day strike with
its two response options became the basis for new planning activities." 59
Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
General Henry H. Shelton warned allied leaders that they "should not initiate these strikes
unless the alliance was willing to escalate, if necessary, and persist until victory was
secured."60

The alliance was prepared to escalate the air strikes in order to force

concessions by Milosevic, and after seventy-eight days it was clear that the air campaign
was effective enough to make Serbian operations in Kosovo difficult to carry out and had
a major impact on the Serbian economy.
In sum, the evidence suggests that the United States played a large role in the
implementation and success of Operation Allied Force. Furthermore, the United States
pressed for the air strikes against Yugoslavia when Belgrade rejected the Rambouillet
Accords. President Bill Clinton reiterated his support for the alliance by stating that U.S.
troops would be involved in a peacekeeping mission if a peace agreement was reached
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even before the air strikes began. 61 This evidence reiterates the United States leadership
role within the alliance, especially considering that the Kosovo crises occurred in Europe.
Furthermore, the evidence presented here shows that there was a large operational gap
between the United States and its NATO allies during Operation Allied Force, and only
Great Britain was able to contribute to the air strikes against Kosovo.

THE CREATION OF KFOR
Cordesman asserts that there are four reasons that in the end forced the Serbian
forces to concede. First, the damage that had been done by NATO aircraft without a
single casualty wore heavily on Serbian moral. Second, Serbia had alienated itself from
the outside world because of its ethnic cleansing tactics. Furthermore, once the Russians
joined NATO in pressuring Milosevic to accept a peace settlement it was obvious that
there would be no outside states that would lend them support. Third, the Serbian forces
were no longer able to engage the KLA in open combat because of the fear of exposing
themselves to NATO air strikes. Finally, there was the very prospect that a NATO
ground invasion may happen. Cordesman argues that these four fundamental reasons are
why Milosevic came to the bargaining table and essentially ended the Serbian campaign
in Kosovo by signing the Military Technical Agreement that laid out the plans for a
Kosovo peace force that came to known as KFOR. 62 It was evident during Operation
Allied Force that the United States was not prepared to put troops on the ground despite
the wishes of European leaders. Because the United States and NATO were able to end
the conflict in Kosovo using air strikes, it is evident that the alliance would not commit
ground troops unless the United States did. Since the United States did not, the European
allies were delegated to performing support mission during the air strikes, which allowed
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the United States to perform precision air strikes without having to coordinate with many
countries.
After Operation Allied Force brought Milosevic and the Serbs to the bargaining
table, an international peacekeeping operation was set up to ensure that there would be no
renewed hostilities. This peacekeeping operation became known as the Kosovo Force or
KFOR. KFOR's mission was to build an environment in which all citizens, despite their
ethnic background, could live in peace and an environment in which democracy could
begin to grow.

KFOR's mandate came from the aforementioned Military Technical

Agreement, which outlines its responsibilities. 63
The KFOR mission, which is still in place, is comprised of a headquarters, four
multinational brigades and 1 multinational specialized unit with 36 nations contributing
to the 50,000-member Kosovo Force. NATO troops form the core of KFOR, which was
tasked to facilitate the return of refugees and ensure an end to the conflict in the area.
Since KFOR arrived in the area close to 1 million refugees have returned home. KFOR
also monitored local elections and cleared over 1 million square meters of landmines.
From KFOR's inception till about July 2000, alliance troop levels were reduced from
about 50,000 to about 38,000. The withdrawal of French, Russian and British troops has
accounted for the majority of the 12,000 troops.

American and German forces have

remained relatively stable. 64
KOFR Headquarters in located in Pristina, Kosovo and supports these four brigades
and the one specialized unit. The commander ofKFOR rotates every six months between
Germany, France, Italy and England and reports to the Commander-in-Chief, Allied
Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH), located in Naples, Italy. 65 The Multinational
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Specialized Unit (MSU) is a police force that has considerable experience in fighting and
combating organized crime and terrorism. This unit conducts routine patrols that allow
the MSU to interact with the community in order to deepen their knowledge of the
criminal and security apparatuses within Kosovo. The MSU is made up of coalition
forces from Italy (the lead nation), France and Estonia. 66
The first multinational brigade is the Multinational Brigade Centre (MBC) which is
located in Pristina, Kosovo. The MBC is responsible for two boundary-crossing points
and their mission is to maintain a safe and secure environment around the areas of
Podujevo, Kosovo Polje, Lipljan, Glocovac and Stimlje. Finland, the first non-NATO
member to enter KFOR, is the lead state. A Finnish-Irish Battle Group consists of troops
from Finland, Ireland and Sweden and the

3rd

Czech-Slovakia Battle Group is made up of

troops from the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The second multinational brigade is the
Multinational Brigade Northeast (MBN), which is located in Mitrovica, Kosovo. France
is the lead nation and Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Luxemburg, and Morocco
also contributing to the MBN. Their mission is to maintain a secure environment, verify
and monitor the Military Technical Agreement, and also provides patrols, checkpoints,
escorts and intelligence. The third brigade is the Multinational Brigade Southwest, which
is located in Prizren, Kosovo. The MBS lead nation is Italy, with ten other nations
providing support for the security of the region.
Finally, and most importantly to this thesis, is the Multinational Brigade East which
is located in Urosevac, Kosovo and the United States in the lead nation.

Armenia,

Greece, Lithuania, Poland and the Ukraine also contribute to the mission of the MBE.
The MBE, also known as Task Force Falcon, is tasked with the monitoring and
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verification of the provisions lay out under the Military Technical Agreement. 67 They are
also tasked with providing support for U.N. humanitarian efforts, and enforcing law and
order during the transition to a civil government. The United States also has about 1000
troops deployed along the border focused on stopping the flow of Kosovar Albanian
weapons and guerrillas into Serbia. 68 Each of these brigades reports directly to KFOR
Headquarters, which reports directly to the Commander-In-Chief, Allied Forces Southern
Europe (CINCSOUTH), located in Naples, Italy. However, little coordination occurs
among the brigades, and despite early efforts by NATO to give the commander of KFOR
control over all the forces deployed there, every brigade makes its own decisions. The
KFOR commander also lacks the ability to draw forces from one brigade area to another
as situations arise. 69
The command structure for KFOR is broken down into the five above-mentioned
territorial sectors. Therefore, the United States' role in the command structure of KFOR
rivals that of the major European powers (Germany, France, England and Italy). The
only exception is that United States' commanders do not participate in the six-month
rotation at KFOR Headquarters.

The United States, along with the British, French,

German and Italian contingents, are in command of their specific sector. The other
nations' contingents are assigned to these sectors and are under the command of the lead
nation. American troops are not under the command of any other nation except its own.
Furthermore, the lead countries in the four sectors rarely, if ever, defer to KFOR
Headquarters. At the outset of the peacekeeping operations that followed the NATO-led
air campaign, the European nations indicated that they intended to play a leading role.
However, by looking at estimations of NATO-member contributions to KFOR, we can
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get a better picture of where the United States stands in comparison to its European allies.
For example, the mean of the European contingents' annual expenditures is $81.2
million.

This $81.2 annually is dwarfed in comparison to the United States' annual

contribution, which is $1. 06 billion. 70
At the outset of KFOR, the European allies wanted to play the leading role, yet even
when the lead countries of Italy, France, Great Britain and Germany's contributions are
added together they still only add up to about half of the annual contributions that the
United States makes in support of the KFOR mission. The contributions of the alliance
members in regards to humanitarian and reconstruction costs lends further evidence that
the United States contributed greatly to the KFOR mission. The total expenditures of the
European allies towards humanitarian and reconstruction assistance add up to about $840
million, just $126 million more than the United States contributed alone. 71 Despite the
European rhetoric that they wanted to take the lead in the KFOR mission, it is quite
evident that the United States still contributed more financially than any one country. In
fact, the United States' contributions equal less than half of the contribution by the
European Union as a whole.
Where do these findings leave the United States in terms of their contribution to the
organizational aspects of KFOR? From the evidence presented above, it can be argued
that the United States is the lead nation in the Kosovo peacekeeping mission despite the
absence of U.S. leadership at KFOR Headquarters.

The evidence also suggests that

without the U.S. contributions both militarily and financially the European allies would
have had a difficult time implementing the Kosovo peacekeeping operation and
maintaining adequate troop levels to support the mission.

The United States
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contributions to the KFOR mission can also be seen in the different responsibilities that
the Multinational Brigade East has in comparison to the remaining four brigades. In
addition to maintaining the peace and security of its area of responsibility (AOR), the
Multinational Brigade East also ensures Serb and Kosovar compliance with the Military
Technical Agreement.

The MBE is also tasked with: ( 1) providing humanitarian

assistance in support of UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees)
efforts. (2) Initial enforcement of basic law and order, transitioning this function to the
designated civilian agency as soon as possible. (3) The establishment and support of
resuming core civil functions. (4) The MBE is also tasked with controlling the flow of
refugees between the Kosovo province and the Republic ofMacedonia. 72
In sum, the evidence shows that the United States contributes the most resources to
KFOR, both in troop levels and financial assistance, in comparison to its European allies
on an individual level. Also, it is interesting that the United States also is the lead nation
in the MBE that has the greatest responsibility.
In a November 2000 report, the EU attempted to show not only its member
countries, but the rest of the world that they were leading the mission in Kosovo. In the
report, they pointed out that European countries deploy 65 percent of the troops
committed to the area while only 15 percent are from the United States. 73 However, if
the troop contributions are divided up between EU members, the United States still has
the largest contingent deployed. In fact, of the EU states that participated in KFOR, only
Italy, France Germany and the United Kingdom contributed troops that even rivaled the
contribution of the United States. In fact if the troop's contributions of the other 15
member countries are added together they make up just slightly more than the U.S.
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contingent. 74 This is contrary to Defense Secretary William Cohen's assertion that the
burden should fall more on the shoulders of the Europeans than it should on the United
States.
The KFOR data details the contributions made by the Europeans in support of
Operation Allied Force which has been seen as a successful NATO mission in which all
nineteen NATO members made some contribution to the alliance, whether it was
politically, militarily, or economically.

However, this operation highlighted the

disparities that exist between the United States and its NATO allies. These disparities
include, but are not limited to, space-based surveillance, large deck carrier operations,
strategic airlift, radar-defeating stealth aircraft, mid-altitude reconnaissance and strike
capabilities during times when visibility was reduced. Nardulli, et al assert that these
disparities were so substantial that it created an impression that NATO was no more than
a cover for what was essentially a U.S. mission. 75
Again, much like in the organization of KFOR, the United States' military
contributions cannot be understated. Of all the NA TO allies deployed in the AOR, the
United States troop contribution of 5,600 is the largest. 76 In addition to the 5,600 troops
that the United States had stationed in their brigade area, there were an additional 1000
troops stationed on the Macedonian and Albanian borders to ensure that KLA troops,
Serbian troops and refugees did not spread into the neighboring countries. The United
States makes up 18 percent of the total NA TO deployment, while France, Germany, Italy
and the United Kingdom average about 13.5 percent of the total NATO deployment. As
mentioned earlier, the European Union made it clear that they have contributed 65
percent of the troops deployed in support of KFOR. 77 Although the United States was
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not the "lead nation" per se, they certainly have contributed more militarily than any
other country that is participating in the peacekeeping operation in Kosovo.
Despite the United State's larger than expected contribution to the mission in
Kosovo, NATO allies and non-NATO partners worked well together in achieving the
military objectives that were assigned to them by NAC. In spite of these contributions
from both member and non-members of NATO, Operation Allied Force and KFOR
highlighted a number of gaps that exists between U.S. capabilities and those of its NATO
allies.

Deficiencies such as space-based surveillance, large deck carrier operations,

strategic airlift, radar-defeating stealth aircraft, mid-altitude reconnaissance and strike
capabilities during times when visibility was reduced, impeded U.S. forces' abilities to
operate at an optimal level of effectiveness by impeding U.S. military commanders
selecting targets. During the early stages of KFOR, alliance member's insufficient air
mobility assets slowed the implementation of KFOR after Milosevic conceded to the
alliance's demands. 78 In the future the deficiencies that exist between the United States
and its NATO allies will challenge its military effectiveness and its ability to operate as
an effective alliance.
Unlike Operation Allied Force, burdensharing amongst the allies has been
relatively equal. Although the United States has more troops deployed to Kosovo than
any other country, it has become quite evident that the European powers and the
European Union specifically, have taken on their share of the burden in terms of
monetary and military contributions.

In terms of the logistical setup of KFOR, all

alliance members (some more than others) have contributed to the brigade that the NAC
had placed them under. Furthermore, the United States' leadership, more specifically the
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Clinton Administration, believed that the United States and the European Union must
work together to rebuild the peace in the area. The Clinton Administration made it clear
at the outset of NATO's involvement in Kosovo that "Europe must provide most of the
resources," this however is not the case as the United States contributed more resources
than any other ally. 79 If the European continent is taken in as a whole, then yes they did
provide most of the resources.
The United States contributed more resources to the KFOR mission than any
other alliance member, militarily, logistically and monetarily. The Clinton Administration
made it clear that Europe must provide most of the resources for this peacekeeping
mission. However, the United States still contributed the most, minus the European
Unions contributions, to the KFOR mission. Additionally, the United States was the lead
nation for the multinational brigade that was tasked with protecting arms and refuge flow.
The evidence suggests that without the United States contributions to KFOR, it is likely
that other alliance members would not have contributed enough to implement the
mission.
THE EVOLUTION OF KFOR

Now that the background for the KFOR mission has been outlined, it is important
to look at how it has evolved over the past few years, and what President George W.
Bush's administration believes to be the right course of action in regards to the
peacekeeping operation in Kosovo.
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001, President Bush has had more
pressing issues to deal with. During President Bush's 2000 presidential campaign, he
said that keeping the peace in the troubled region is a European, not American,
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responsibility. Furthermore, President Bush's National Security Advisor Condoleezza
Rice said that the United States military was overextended globally and therefore the
peacekeeping operation in Kosovo should be taken over by its European allies. 80 After
taking office, the Bush Administration adopted a more cautious tone and in 2001,
Secretary of State Colin Powell said the United States was reviewing U.S. troop levels in
Bosnia and Kosovo with the objective ofreducing them over time, but wanted to stress to
its NATO partners that the United States was not cutting and running. 81 Secretary of
State Colin Powell also stated in February 2001 that the United States had a commitment
to the peace in Kosovo and would continue its presence in the Balkans. 82 In a June 2001
visit to NATO headquarters in Brussels, President Bush reiterated the U.S. position
stating, "We understand that America's contribution is essential, both militarily and
politically. We will not draw down our forces in Bosnia or Kosovo precipitously or
unilaterally.

We came in together, and we will go out together." 83

The Bush

Administration made it clear that they would review U.S. troop levels in Kosovo with the
objective of reducing them over time, but reiterated to its alliance partners that they
would not simply cut and run. In a July 24, 2001 visit by President Bush to U.S. troops
in Kosovo, the president stated:
We will not draw down our forces in Bosnia or Kosovo precipitously or
unilaterally .... but our goal is to hasten the day when peace is selfNATO's
sustaining ... and when NATO's forces can go home.
commitment to the peace of this region is enduring, but the stationing of
our forces here should not be indefinite." 84

In 2002, President Bush also reiterated to both the House and Senate foreign relations
committees "that the Europeans have carried a significant portion of the aid-sharing
burden in the region and that their commitment to reconstruction, humanitarian relief, and

47

institution and peace-building has been a strong one. Continued attention and
commitments of assistance from all donors remain crucial for medium- and long-term
development in Kosovo. " 85
However, in the past two years President Bush's has expressed concerns over the
longevity and commitment to KFOR stating that he hopes for a gradual decrease in U.S.
force contributions to the area. In a letter to Congress dated January 31, 2003, President
Bush stated that:
The term "militarily significant" relates to tasks and objectives significant
from a military standpoint that once accomplished, would allow for
withdrawal of military forces from Kosovo. In the establishment of the
Kosovo benchmarks, four critical tasks for NATO forces were identified:
military stability; public security; border/boundary issues; and war
crimes/support to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia.... I anticipate that Kosovo Force and U.S. participation in it
will gradually reduce in size as public security conditions improve and
Kosovars assume increasing responsibility for their own selfgovemment. 86
After the terrorist attack of 2001 on the United States, one can begin to see the evolution
of U.S./NATO relations. This can be seen in President Bush's foreign policy decision
after 9/11.

Before the terrorist attacks, President Bush was willing to continue the

peacekeeping operations in the Balkans as long as the operation was reevaluated every
six months as set out by the KFOR initiative. President Bush's vision of U.S./NATO
relations began to change after the terrorist attacks and this will be seen in greater detail
in the chapters that follow. However, in the context of the mission in Kosovo, it was and
continues to be evident that the United States was able to work within the alliance. It is
also evident in the case of KFOR that, minus Operation Allied Force, the United States
and its alliance partners have shared the burden.

In order for NATO to continue its

position in the international community, this must continue. Since the attacks on the
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United States, the alliance has come to the United States' aid and has taken on an even
larger burden than they had prior to 9/11 in Kosovo. This is further evidence that the
U.S./NATO relationship may be fragile, but not broken and has continued to persevere in
the post-Cold War/post-9/11 environment.
As of July 2004, U.S. troop's level in the Balkans is down to about 10 percent of
the total KFOR force. By contrast, as will be seen in the chapters to follow, the United
States provides about 75 percent of the manpower in Afghanistan and 90 percent in
Iraq. 87 Because the United States' NATO allies have agreed to take on a much larger
burden in the Balkans the United States is able to shift its forces elsewhere. Since the
beginning of the War on Terrorism, the United States has begun and continued to
outsource its troops and supplies away from KFOR. At the same time the European
NATO allies have upped their own commitments to the peace in the Balkans, which now
includes Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia. 88

CONCLUSION:

Ultimately, U.S. allies shared the burden of the peacekeeping operation in
Kosovo, but the United States was responsible for most of the allied strikes during
Operation Allied Force. The major powers in Europe contributed troops that rivaled the
United States' contributions. Since the KFOR mission began in 1999, the United States
has decreased its level troop commitment. Furthermore, the United States has outsourced
its resources to other parts of the world that the Bush Administration believes threaten the
security of the United States.

The Bush Administration, after great hesitation, has

embraced both peacekeeping and multilateralism in the Kosovo reg10n.

The
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administration however has shown reluctance to subjecting U.S. freedom of operation to
the latter.
It is important to reiterate that at the outset of the KFOR peacekeeping mission

the United States contributed more troops than any other NATO partner. The Clinton
Administration, and subsequent Bush Administration, has made it clear that the European
partners should carry much of the burden in Kosovo. This however was not the case at
the outset of the mission and has only changed since the attacks on the United States. To
lend further evidence to the U.S. leadership position in NATO, it was the United States
that took the lead in stopping the humanitarian catastrophe that was taking place on the
European continent and was putting the peace and stability of the region in jeopardy.
Future history lessons will likely show that KFOR was successful in completing
its aforementioned goals, and the logistical setup of KFOR had a lot to do with this. The
multinational brigades that have been setup throughout the country show the
interoperability of the alliance. The success can be shown through the progress that has
occurred since KFOR's inception in 1999. In accordance with the Military Technical
Agreement (MTA), Yugoslav and Serbian forces have withdrawn from Kosovo and the
five-kilometer buffer zone.

KFOR is also responsible for the training and

implementation of the Kosovo Protection Corps, which in time will be accountable to
Kosovo's democratically elected leadership.
Most of the evidence that was presented in this chapter shows that the United
States was instrumental in the organization and logistical aspects of KFOR. The Clinton
Administration, especially Clinton's Secretary of State Madeline Albright, was very
influential in establishing KFOR. Furthermore, the United States took command of the
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Multinational Brigade whose mission was more dangerous than the other brigades. The
evidence also shows that initially the United States played a key logistical role, not only
in Operation Allied Force, but also in the setup of the Kosovo peacekeeping mission.
What is disturbing about this is that the violence was taking place on the European
continent, yet it took the United States to pressure its European NATO allies to intervene.
Finally, the evidence in this case has shown that the United States has begun to distance
itself from the alliance. During Bush's campaign he said that he wanted to reduce the
level of troops in Kosovo, and he has fulfilled that promise. Part of this can be attributed
to the United States redeploying troops to Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring
Freedom, but since 9/11 the evidence shows that the United States is distancing itself
from the KFOR. However, the KFOR mission continues to move forward with more
European countries pledging troops to fill the void left by the United States.
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CHAPTER III
AFGHANISTAN
ISAF
Afghanistan is located in Southern Asia northwest of Pakistan and east of Iran.
Afghanistan's recent history has been filled with war and civil unrest. In 1979 the Soviet
Union invaded Afghanistan, but was forced to leave by the anti-Communist Mujahidin
forces that were trained and supplied by the United States, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, as
well as many others. The Soviet-backed Communist government fought on until about
1992, when an intense battle for control erupted between warring warlords.

These

various Mujahidin factions eventually produced the foreign sponsored Taliban
government in 1996.

The Taliban was able to capture most of the country and

consolidate power. 89
Following the September 11 1h attacks on the United States, a U.S.-led alliance
toppled the Taliban. At a 2001 meeting in Bonn, Germany, leaders from the Afghan
opposition groups met and agreed upon a plan to formulize a new democratically elected
government.

At this time the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was

developed to help establish a working government that is representative of the
population, as well as developing an Afghanistan that is able to develop a self-sustaining
peaceful country that is able to provide its own security.
Following the terrorist attacks against the United States, the Bush Administration
made it clear that any country that harbored terrorists would be dealt with by force. In
the aftermath of 9/11, NATO implemented Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. This
article states that "an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North

52

America shall be considered an attack against all of them." Immediately after the strikes
of 9/11, NATO Secretary General George Robertson condemned the attacks:
I condemn in the strongest possible terms the senseless attacks which have
just been perpetrated against the United States of America .... These
barbaric acts constitute intolerable aggression against democracy and
underlie the need for the international community and the members of the
alliance to unite their forces in fighting the scourge of terrorism. 90
The Taliban regime in Afghanistan allowed the Al Qaeda terrorist network, led by
Osama Bin Laden, to operate within Afghanistan undeterred to train their militants and
base their operations. In the weeks leading up to the invasion of Afghanistan, President
George Bush issued a five point ultimatum to the Taliban government. First, the Taliban
must deliver to United States authorities all of the leaders of Al-Qaeda who hide in
Afghanistan. Second, the Taliban must release all foreign nationals, including American
citizens that have been unjustly imprisoned within Afghanistan. Third, the Taliban must
protect all foreign journalists, diplomats and aid workers that are working in Afghanistan.
Fourth, the Taliban must close every terrorist training camp within Afghanistan and hand
over terrorists, along with their support structure, to the appropriate international
authorities.

Finally, the Taliban must give the United States full access to terrorist

training camps so it can be assured that they are no longer operational.

THE BACKGROUND OF ISAF
On Sunday, October 7, 2001, after the defiance of the Taliban regime to meet
President Bush's ultimatum, Operation Enduring Freedom commenced with U.S. and
British aerial bombings targeting Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces. 91 Operation Enduring
Freedom was not a NATO mission. Sixteen countries, however, did contribute resources
to the U.S.-led coalition. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfield outlined six goals the
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air campaign would accomplish. First, was to make clear to the Taliban that harboring
terrorists carriers a heavy price. Second, was to acquire the necessary intelligence to
facilitate any future operations that may be taken against the al-Qaeda terrorist network
and the Taliban regime. Third, was to develop working relationships with forces within
Afghanistan that opposed the Taliban government and al-Qaeda. Fourth, was to make it
difficult for terrorists to use Afghanistan as a base for its operations. Fifth, was to alter
the military balance by denying the Taliban government the necessary resources to stay
in power and allowing opposition forces to catch up.

Finally, was to provide the

necessary humanitarian aid to the Afghani people who had suffered oppressive living
conditions under the Taliban government. 92
American military officials wanted a clear chain of command that would be void of
the problems that existed in the air war over Kosovo, when NATO interfered with the
selection of targets.

Furthermore, U.S. military officials did not want a significant

amount of assistance from its alliance partners. Since the bulk of the campaign was
dependent on air strikes, only a small number of ground troops were required to complete
the mission.

Therefore, only about 68,000 National Guard and Reserve forces were

activated, or about a third of the number activated for the first Gulf War. 93 This limited
number of forces also enabled the United States to have a centralized command structure
in which they would not be dependent upon consensus decision-making. Philip Gordon
asserts that U.S. policy saw:
European support as politically useful but not particularly significant
militarily. In this case it was reinforced by what many Americans saw as
a key "lesson" of Kosovo. Whereas many in Europe saw the Kosovo air
campaign as excessively dominated by the United States and American
generals, most Americans-particularly within the military-saw just the
opposite: excessive European meddling, with French politicians and
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European lawyers interfering with efficient targeting and bombing runs,
and compromising operational security. This time, the Bush team
determined, would be different. 94
It was clear from the beginning of the operation m Afghanistan that the Bush

Administration wanted to steer clear of having to run everything past its European allies
before they were able to act.
After the military campaign had ended, it was clear to American leaders that a
centralized command structure worked far better than the consensus-building structure
that they had experienced during the air war over Kosovo. Although the European allies
did not contribute greatly to Operation Enduring Freedom, the invocation of Article 5 did
lead to a variety of assistance that helped make possible the success of the mission. In
late September and early October, the Bush Administration made eight specific requests
of the alliance. None of the requests, however, required any substantial deployments of
NATO forces. 95 The fulfillment of these requests acted as a mechanism for the United
States to use NATO as a way to coordinate measures amongst the allies and members of
non-NATO coalition forces. Furthermore, these requests cleared the way for the United
States to redeploy its troops from other ongoing NATO operations to the Afghan theatre.
Secretary of State Colin Powell asserted that the actions of the alliance demonstrate the
future viability of the alliance:
I think these actions show the viability of the alliance, shows that the
alliance is growing; the alliance has a role to play. More and more nations
want to become a part of the great alliance which has done such a brilliant
job of preserving the peace and which is finding new missions for the
future that will make it as vital as it has been in the past. 96
The contributions of the alliance, such as intelligence sharing and increasing their troop
levels in the Balkans to replace American troops, increased the capabilities of the
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coalition forces in Afghanistan and also freed up American resources that were involved
in NATO missions elsewhere.

Furthermore, for the first time in its history, NATO

invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

Even the invocation of Article 5 was

different in the original scope of the alliance because it was invoked not to defend
Europe, as was the original purpose, but to support a U.S.-led war outside the traditional
boundaries of the European continent.
However, it was evident during Operation Enduring Freedom that the United
States did not want military operations to be tied up in the alliance by being dependent
upon building a consensus to complete the mission. Instead, the United States picked and
chose resources amongst the allies that they believed would be the most beneficial to
them.

This was made possible by the type of missions that were set forth during

Operation Enduring Freedom in which the United States was dependent on anti-Taliban
forces more so than its NATO partners. 97
In sum, Operation Enduring Freedom was comprised almost exclusively of U.S.
troops and the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance who have been battling the Taliban since
its takeover in the mid- l 990s. The United States' NATO allies contributed by increasing
their intelligence sharing, increasing their troop levels in the Balkans, and taking over the
United States AWACS mission in Kosovo.

Although the military campaign in

Afghanistan did not require any significant resources from the United States' European
allies, the alliance's actions did help facilitate the success of the campaign. Lansford
asserts that the alliance helped the United States in a number of ways including the
invocation of Article 5 and strong diplomatic support for the Bush Administration at the
outset of the war in Afghanistan. The alliance allowed for better cooperation between the
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United States and the European Union, and NATO helped provide a forum in which
U.S./Russian relations could be built upon.
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the evidence presented here that is
important to the future of the alliance. However, addressing two of the most evident
conclusions is sufficient to understand U.S./NATO relations. First, the United States did
not want to work within the confines of NATO's military structure. Instead the United
States picked the resources that they needed in order to complete the mission of
overthrowing the Taliban regime. Second, the United States wanted to ensure that the
mission in Afghanistan would be autonomous from NATO's consensus decision-making
process. By keeping Operation Enduring Freedom a U.S.-led coalition mission, instead
of a NATO mission, the United States avoided the problems that they encountered in
Kosovo when some alliance members disagreed with target selection.

THE CREATION OF ISAF
After the major military operations in Afghanistan, that consisted U.S. forces, a
coalition of 16 NATO members and non-NATO members, and Afghan anti-Taliban
guerillas (the Northern Alliance), the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was
developed. The International Security Assistance Force was established in December
2001 at the Bonn Conference under the authorization of the United Nations Security
Council, and was tasked with securing Kabul from Taliban and Al-Qaeda elements and to
help ensure the peaceful transition to the newly formed Afghan Transitional
Administration. The agreements at the Bonn Conference helped to create a partnership
between the Afghan Transitional Authority, the United Nations Assistance Mission in
Afghanistan and ISAF. 98 ISAF in not a U.N. peacekeeping force, instead it is made up of
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a coalition of the willing that are deployed under the authority of U.N. Security Council
Resolutions 1386, 1413, 1444 and 1510. These U.S. resolutions set the parameters of the
international assistance force that NATO eventually took over from the United Nations.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1386 authorizes:
as envisaged in Annex 1 to the Bonn Agreement, the establishment for 6
months of an International Security Assistance Force to assist the Afghan
Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its
surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the
personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure environment. 99
Security Council Resolution 1413 authorizes:
The Member States participating in the International Security assistance
Force to take all necessary measures to fulfill the mandate of the
International Security Assistance Force; and calls upon Member States to
contribute personnel, equipment and other resources to the International
Security Assistance Force, and to make contributions to the Trust Fund
established pursuant to resolution 1386. 100
U. N. Security Council Resolutions 1444 and 1510 reaffirms the U.N.'s support for
Resolutions 1389 and 1413. Originally, individual nations volunteered to lead the ISAF
mission and turned over authority after a six-month rotation. ISAF was originally made
up by a coalition that was deployed under the authority of the U.N. Security Council.
However, ISAF saw its share of problems in which it became more and more difficult to
find a country that was willing to take over command of the mission. Furthermore, it
became increasingly difficult to set up a new command headquarters every six months
when a change of command took place. From December 2001 until August 2003, ISAF
was under the authority of the United Nations (led by the United Kingdom, Germany,
Turkey and the Netherlands).
Before NATO took over operationally of ISAF it became increasingly difficult to
set up a new command headquarters every six months when a change of command took
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place. The United Nations handed over command and control because it became more
and more difficult to fill command slots and troop contributions to the mission. The
United Nations believed that if NATO took over the ISAF mission that it would alleviate
this problem. 101 However, it will be shown later that NATO incurred the same problems
of countries fulfilling their pledges for troop contributions.
In August 2003, NATO took over command and control of ISAF and by taking
over this peacekeeping mission, NATO initially helped overcome this problem.

By

taking over, NATO also allowed smaller countries that did not have the resources to take
over command as the lead nation to be able to contribute to the alliance and the mission
in Afghanistan which enabled them to play a strong role within ISAF. On August 11,
2003, ISAF came under NATO command with Canada as the lead nation. 102
ISAF, through NATO leadership, was established to help develop the conditions
in Afghanistan in which it can enjoy a representative government and a self-sustaining
peace. 103

ISAF's role in Afghanistan is to assist the newly formed transitional

government, as well the international community, in maintaining the peace and security
in the area of responsibility. ISAF also supports the Afghan Transitional Authority in
expanding its authority across the country and in providing a safe environment in which
free and fair elections can take place, spreading of the rule of law as well as helping in
the reconstruction of the country.

Furthermore, ISAF has helped to train the newly

formed Afghan police force in Kabul as well as helping to rebuild the infrastructure
including the rehabilitation of schools and hospital, restoring the countries' water supply
as well as many other civil-military projects.
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ISAF is structured into four components.

First, ISAF Headquarters provides

direction and planning for the Kabul Multinational Brigade as well as conducting
operations to ensure the security within the area of responsibility. ISAF Headquarters is
also tasked with acting as a liaison between the Afghan Transitional Government and the
governmental and non-governmental organizations providing assistance to the country.
Second, the Kabul Multination Brigade is ISAF's technical headquarters which is
responsible for the daily planning and patrolling the Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC)
operations. Third, the Kabul Afghan International Airport assists in the operation of the
airport.

Finally, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) help develop a secure

environment for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. 104
ISAF is under the direct command on the North Atlantic Council, which provides
the political direction and coordination for the mission in Afghanistan. Based on this
guidance, command and control of the ISAF mission is exercised by NATO's military
headquarters, namely the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) led
by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). The Joint Force Commander
(JFC) is responsible for the manning, training, deploying and sustaining of ISAF.
Currently ISAF conducts patrols throughout Afghanistan's eighteen police districts to
ensure a safe environment to the local population. It also coordinates CIMIC projects
throughout its PRTs and works closely with the government of Afghanistan to support
stabilization, reconstruction and nation-building activities. Politically, ISAF works with
the Afghan government, the United Nations and the U.S.-led Operation Enduring
Freedom in support of Afghanistan's security reform efforts. The ISAF mission and the
ongoing Operation Enduring Freedom are two separate missions. While ISAF provides
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security and peace for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom
continues to be involved in combat operations hunting down Taliban and al-Qaeda
operatives. The PRTs are civil-military partnerships that demonstrate the commitment of
the international community to the peace and security of Afghanistan. The civilian and
military sectors are separate and only the military element is under the ISAF chain of
command. The purpose of the PRTs is to help the transitional government extend its
authority, to develop a secure environment and establish relations with local authorities,
and to support activities that facilitate the reconstruction effort. 105
What is notable about ISAF is the lack of U.S. leadership within the mission.
Initially, the United States made it clear that the mandate for NATO's peacekeepers
would be separate from that of U.S. troops in search of Al-Qaeda fighters and Osama bin
Laden. 106

While contributing countries to ISAF perform no military operations, the

United States and the Northern Alliance continue to search for Taliban and Al-Qaeda
forces. ISAF forces on the other hand conduct no military patrols; instead they are there
exclusively to ensure that the peace and security of the region is not threatened.
By looking at a breakdown of ISAF troop contributions by allied nations a clearer
look at the United States' reluctance to participate comes to light. For instance, ISAF
began with around 6,500 troops from the twenty-six NATO members as well as nine
partner nations and two non-NATO/non-Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)
nations. 107 NATO's non-American member countries constitute about 95 percent of the
6,500 troops. Germany has the largest deployment in the region with approximately
2,300 (about 35 percent) troops, while Canada is second with about 1,800 (about 28
percent) troops. By comparison, the United States contributes only 67 Gust a little over 1
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percent) support personnel to the ISAF mission. This is in sharp contrast to the KFOR
mission in Kosovo where the Unites States supplied the most troops and was also a lead
nation in one of the brigade sectors. 108
Despite the invocation of Article 5, the transatlantic alliance was divided over the
operations in Afghanistan. This fragmentation began in Kosovo when European leaders,
most notably French and German, believed that the air war and subsequent peacekeeping
operations were largely U.S. operations. The French on the other hand were displeased
with their overall contributions to the mission in Afghanistan, and wanted to have a
greater role in the military operations being conducted by the United States. The French
were concerned that if they were delegated to the sidelines and relegated to cleaning up
after the United States completed its military mission they would lose their rank-and-file
position within the alliance. The French government took, what they called, a "balancer"
position to ensure that the United States did not overstep their boundaries and expand
military operations unnecessarily. 109
Although the United States has only contributed some 67 personnel to the NATOled ISAF mission, it is not fair to underscore the contributions that the United States has
made to the overall mission in Afghanistan of peace and security. Not only did the
United States and British-led coalition defeat the Taliban regime and the Al-Qaeda
networks that were working out of Afghanistan, but they continued to pursue these two
groups after the peacekeeping mission had begun. There were about 13,000 American
troops, which were tasked with hunting down Al Qaeda terrorists and remnants of the
Taliban regime. This American-led force of 13,000 troops operates separately from the
NATO-led ISAF mission.
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In December 2002, the Defense Department announced the concept of the PRTs
to provide a safe haven for international aid workers that were helping with the
reconstruction of Afghanistan. The United States was important to the development of
ISAF and the expansion of the PRTs.

The evidence shows that at the outset of the

NATO-led ISAF mission, the Bush Administration was attempting to strengthen the
ISAF mission by focusing on the concept of these PRTs to help foster the conditions
necessary for the reconstruction effort. At the outset of Operation Enduring Freedom it is
evident that the United States wanted to avoid the consensus-building decision making
process that NATO requires. Therefore, the Bush Administration limited the amount of
contributions that the alliance provided for this mission. They instead built a coalition of
the willing, which allowed the United States to bypass NATO's integrated military
command structure.

When it was time to implement a peacekeeping operation in

Afghanistan, the United States pressed for NATO to take its lead. The United States
continues its pursuit of al-Qaeda and Taliban forces in the Afghan countryside.
The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which help to develop a secure
environment throughout Afghanistan, were originally restricted to the area within and
around Kabul. However, UN Security Council Resolution 1510 changed this and now
nineteen PRTs operate throughout Afghanistan. Resolution 1510 authorizes:
The expansion of the mandate of the International Security Assistance
Force to allow it, as resources permit, to support the Afghan Transitional
Authority and its successors in the maintenance of security in areas of
Afghanistan outside of Kabul and its environs, so that the Afghan
Authorities as well as the personnel of the United Nations and other
international civilian personnel engaged, in particular, in reconstruction
and humanitarian efforts, can operate in a secure environment, and to
provide security assistance for the performance of other tasks in support of
the Bonn Agreement. Calls upon the International Security Assistance
Force to continue to work in close consultation with the Afghan
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Transitional Authority and its successors and the Special Representative of
the Secretary-General as well as with the Operation Enduring Freedom
Coalition in the implementation of the force mandate. 110
Currently, the United States, the United Kingdom, New Zealand (a non-NATO member)
and Germany are in command of the PRTs while other coalition partners contribute team
members.11 1 Through these PRTs, the United States' has helped the Afghan people carry
out their own civil-military operations as well as their own security functions.

The

United States has trained over 15,000 troops that are a part of the Afghan National Army.
Members of the Afghan National Army are deployed by the Afghan transitional
government to sixteen provinces. The United States has also trained over 25,000 police
officers at the five regional training centers throughout Afghanistan. 112

ISAF also

assisted the Afghan government in providing a secure environment in which the country
could hold its first elections that were free and fair.
Although the United States has contributed little to the organizational, military
and logistical aspects of ISAF, the U.S. has made life much easier for its Atlantic
partners. The United States, through the ongoing Operation Enduring Freedom, has been
able to reduce the possibility that the Taliban regime could resurface in Afghanistan.
Since Afghanistan is still relatively unstable and ISAF is working to stabilize it, the
United States has contributed greatly to the NATO mission. It is important to note here
that NATO was able to successfully implement a peacekeeping mission without the large
troop contributions of the United States. However, ISAF has come under great scrutiny
because NATO has found it difficult to maintain an adequate level of troop commitments.
Since NATO decided to expand its area of responsibility outside the city of Kabul, many
nations have reneged on sending more troops while others have proposed sending civilian
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contractors in to fulfill their commitments to ISAF. Paul Rice, spokesman for the ISAF
mission said in a December 2003 statement that "you can't plan until you know who will
give what ... we're going to piece together whatever we can get our hands on." 113 Rice
also pointed out that the number of troops from non-US alliance members equals
approximately 1.5 million and can deploy some 7,000 helicopters. However, the alliance
has had trouble maintaining a troop level of about 6,700 and as of December 2003,
NATO had only three helicopters deployed in the area. 114 The NATO-led ISAF mission
depends largely on the United States to provide air support, medical evacuations and
resupply. 115
Despite the fact that the United States has contributed very little to the ISAF
mission, it is still evident that the United States continues to have a leadership position
within the alliance. This is evident by the evolution of the mission that will be discussed
in the next section.

While some may argue, most notably Lansford, that Operation

Enduring Freedom and the subsequent ISAF peacekeeping missions shows the viability
of the alliance, others have noted that this is the beginning of the end for the transatlantic
alliance. By looking at ISAF's structure, it is evident that the United States continues to
hold a leadership position within the alliance. Although the U.S. does not contribute
much directly to the ISAF mission, they are still in command of many of the PRTs that
have now ventured out across the country. Also, the United States continues to provide
close air support, medical evacuations and resupply of troops when needed.

The

structure of ISAF, most importantly the development and expansion of the PRTs, was
developed by the United States before NATO took over the mission from the United
Nations.

Therefore, it is evident that the United States has been instrumental in

65

development and expansion of the mission, even if ISAF lacks U.S. contributions. One
important conclusion comes to light here, and that is the fact that the United States has
begun to retreat from the alliance. Instead the United States is taking a much more
autonomous, or unilateral, approach to foreign policy in regards to the alliance. The
evidence of the creation of ISAF suggests that the United States prefers not to have its
hands tied by alliance members. While NATO is the core ofISAF, the evidence suggests
that without the United States and Afghanistan transitional government asking NATO to
take on a larger role in the security of Afghanistan, NATO may not have implemented
such a mission.
THE EVOLUTION OF ISAF

At the outset of the NATO-led ISAF mission, President Bush maintained that the
United States would not participate in any peacekeeping operations within Afghanistan.
Instead, the approximately 13,000 combat troops deployed within Afghanistan would
continue to hunt down remnants of the Taliban regime and Al-Qaeda terrorist network.
More recently however, the United States troops deployed in the area of responsibility
have assisted ISAF in a number of ways including logistical, intelligence and quick
reaction force support, but the U.S. troops still do not participate in any peacekeeping
operations.
The ISAF peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan has evolved from about 4,500
troops in 2003 when NATO took over the mission, to about 9,000 as recently as the first
presidential elections that took place on October 9, 2004. 116

The mission has also

expanded beyond the original area of responsibility of Kabul. When the United Nations
proposed that ISAF expand outside of the region of Kabul, Washington opposed it
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fearing that the peacekeeping operations would interfere with the United States' military
campaign to eliminate Al-Qaeda and the former Taliban regime. While the United States
opposed this expansion, many European leaders expressed a willingness to commit more
troops to ISAF. However, once it was decided that ISAF would be expanded, these same
European countries have lost their desire to commit these additional troops. 117
In early February 2003, the U.S. Secretary of Defense called on NATO to take on
a larger role in Afghanistan by expanding the number of PRTs to help develop a safer
environment for the reconstruction of the country. 118 At about the same time, Afghan
President Hamid Karzai said that the expansion of ISAF is vital for the improving
reconstruction and security of the country. 119 By June 2004, there were ten U.S.-led PRTs
in operation throughout the country. Since this time, the United States' NATO allies
have taken over most of these PRTs, while the United States continues to run the PRTs in
southern and eastern Afghanistan emphasizing counter-insurgency and anti-al Qaeda
missions instead of focusing on the rebuilding of Afghanistan's infrastructure like the
other PRTs.
Recently, the United States has begun to press its alliance partners into combining
the peacekeeping efforts with the U.S.-led combat operations.

Nicholas Burns, U.S.

ambassador to NATO stated, "Most countries that spoke today, including our country,
said the goal should be one NATO mission," rather than the two separate missions that
have been ongoing since ISAF was deployed to Afghanistan. 120

However, France and

Germany has opposed any merger between the U.S. and NATO forces. The German and
French governments have criticized this move as a way in which the United States could
reduce its troop levels in Afghanistan to redeploy them to Iraq. Whether this is a fracture
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within the alliance is yet to be seen, but it is evident that the rift over Iraq has certainly
spilled over within the alliance, affecting other NA TO missions such as ISAF. German
Defense Minister Peter Stuck has said that Germany would be opposed to any union
between ISAF's peacekeeping mission and the U.S. combat operations. Stuck said that:
"There is a clear "no" of the German government for a merging of the
mandates ... We'll continue focusing on reconstruction while other nations
are engaged in the fight against international terrorism." 121
Unlike the peacekeeping mission in Kosovo, the United States has not contributed
much to the peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan.

In fact, as of October 2004, the

United States has contributed just the 67 command and support personnel to ISAF while
its NATO partners scramble to fill the troop commitment levels that are needed to ensure
that the mission is successful. The evidence suggests that the lack of U.S. contributions
to the peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan is a possible retreat from the alliance. This
anomaly can be attributed to a number of reasons. First, the United States saw in both
Bosnia and Kosovo that the military and operational gap within the alliance was larger
:han expected and NATO lacked the necessary interoperability to fulfill the objectives of
:he mission. Second, the United States did not have the Europeans interfering, through
he alliance's centralized command structure, with the logistical planning and
mplementation of Operation Enduring Freedom.

Instead, the United States worked

vithin the military framework of United States military leaders. The coalition that the
Jnited States formed was a broad-based coalition of the willing including both member
.nd non-member NATO countries. Furthermore, at the outset of Operation Enduring
1reedom,

NA TO was leadership was not involved in the planning or implementation of

1e operation. Finally and maybe most importantly, is how ISAF has evolved since the
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invasion of Iraq. Since there was a division within the alliance of whether or not to go to
war with Iraq, it made the United States' decision to basically conduct Operation
Enduring Freedom and the continuous search for Al-Qaeda and Taliban remnants alone
easier. Because some alliance members interfered with the logistics of the air war during
Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, it made more sense to the United States to carry out
Operation Enduring Freedom without outsourcing command to the alliance. It was much
easier for the United States to work within a coalition that wanted to contribute to the war
on terror, not from states that felt they had to because of their membership in NATO.
In sum, the United States has moved away from the alliance in terms of
contributing troops to NATO peacekeeping missions. In August 2003, President Bush
reiterated this by stating that the U.S. presence is being "gradually replaced" by troops
from NATO allies. He reiterated this by stating:
"We've got about 10,000 troops there, which is down from, obviously,
major combat operations," he said. "And they're there to provide security
and they're there to provide reconstruction help. But both those functions
are being gradually replaced by other troops. Germany, for example, is
now providing the troops for ISAF [International Security Assistance
Force], which is the security force for Afghanistan, under NATO control.
In other words, more and more coalition forces and friends are beginning
to carry a lot of the burden in Afghanistan." 122
Notice that President Bush referred to these troops as providing the security and
reconstruction help for the Afghan government. He also states that these functions are
being "replaced" by other troops, which is likely a reference to the newly developing
PRTs that have recently been expanded outside of Kabul. It is also important to point out
that "more and more coalition forces" are taking on a bigger role in Afghanistan.
However, as mentioned before, NATO allies are reluctant to come to a consensus on the
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fusion of the ISAF mission under NATO command and Operation Enduring Freedom
under U.S. command.
In a November 10, 2004 meeting with NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop
Scheffer, President Bush repeated the United States' "commitment to a strong and vibrant
NAT0." 123

At this same meeting Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer stressed to

President Bush "that NATO is the most effective way for Allies to meet their 21st
century requirements, more so than going it alone or coalitions of the willing. In
Afghanistan, Kosovo, and through training assistance to Iraq, the Alliance is delivering
on its commitments." 124

CONCLUSION:
The development, and subsequent evolution, of ISAF is not only important to the
future of Afghanistan, but also to NATO's future. This is the first mission that NATO
has undertaken outside the traditional boundaries of Europe, and it is important to its
future viability and vibrancy that all member countries work together to ensure its
success. The U.S.-led war with Iraq placed quite a bit of stress upon the alliance. During
the past year, the United States and its European partners have been struggling with this
division.
However, it is important to point out the dissent within the alliance that occurred
when forces were pulled out of the Afghan region and redeployed in support of Operation
Iraqi Freedom. Most notably was the dissent by Germany and France, two of the larger
European powers. In a strange tum of events in early October 2004, the United States
began to ask NATO to take on a larger role in Afghanistan by fusing together the ISAF
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mission with U.S. combat operations. U.S. Ambassador to NATO Nicholas Bums told
reporters on October 12, 2004 that the aim of the United States is to combine the two
missions under one NATO command.

Germany and France adamantly oppose any

combination of the two missions, believing it to be counterproductive and makes no sense
because combining combat operations with peacekeeping is logistically difficult to
achieve with any efficiency. However, both countries have left open the door for larger
troop contributions as well as supporting the expansion of the ISAF force throughout the
country. 125 NATO has now increased the number of troops in Afghanistan to about 9,000
in anticipation of the first democratically held elections in the new independent
Afghanistan. 126 The successful elections that took place under the watchful eye of NATO
and the United Nations can only further the future viability of the alliance.

If the

elections in Afghanistan are successful, the legitimacy of NATO as an alliance that is
able to spread democratic values will inevitably improve. That is if the alliance can
recover from the fracture that developed in the wake of the U.S.-led invasion in Iraq and
subsequent requests by the United States for NATO to take on an active role in Iraq's
rebuilding process.
Three lessons emerge from the evidence in this chapter. First, NATO leadership
found it difficult to maintain an adequate troop level to support ISAF. NATO took over
the ISF mission from the United Nations because the U.N. could not get countries to
volunteer resources and troops to the ISAF mission.

Until more recently, NATO

inevitably ran into the same problem. Second, the United States originally did not want
to give up command of Operation Enduring Freedom. Instead, the United States kept
operational autonomy, most likely because of lessons learned in Kosovo, of combat
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operations dealing with the hunting down of al-Qaeda and Taliban remnants. The United
Kingdom was the only country that the United States felt a desire to cooperate with
during these missions. Finally, European partners believed that the United States only
asked to fuse the ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom missions together because they
wanted the flexibility of redeploying troops to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi
Freedom. 127 However, the United States has rebuffed this claim and has attempted to
assure alliance members that the increase in ISAF troop levels is solely for the purpose of
protecting the legitimacy of the November 2004 elections. The alliance has maintained
that Afghanistan is now NATO's number one priority and argue that the alliance has no
place in Iraq until the mission in Afghanistan is complete. 128
Unfortunately the split that occurred over the United States' decision to overthrow
the Hussein regime in Iraq has had a spill over effect into other NATO missions,
including ISAF and the Training Implementation Mission just underway in Iraq. Unless
the United States, Germany, Belgium and France can get over this rift, the future of the
alliance is in question. This rift has slowed the decision making process within NATO to
almost a halt. Finally, many scholars argued that the expansion of NATO would slow
down the decision-making process and make unanimity nearly impossible. Not many
believed that it would be some of the alliance's oldest and most powerful members that
would make this anomaly come true.
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CHAPTER IV
IRAQ
TRAINING IMPLEMENTATION MISSION
(NTIM-I)
Following the 1991 Gulf War, in which a U.S.-led coalition expelled Iraq from
Kuwait, the United Nations placed sanctions on the Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein.
For twelve years Saddam Hussein ignored and violated United Nations Security Council
resolutions. On March 19 2003, a U.S.-led invasion took place to oust the Iraqi president.
This invasion, known as Operation Iraqi Freedom, was a dark point in the history of the
transatlantic alliance. Under great scrutiny from some of the larger members, namely
Belgium, France and Germany, the United States and Great Britain were the lead nations
during the war with Iraq. Soon after the U.S.-led coalition toppled the Hussein regime in
Iraq, it was up to the international community to develop a plan to stabilize the region.
Despite the dissent within the alliance, NATO once again came to the aid of the United
States by developing the training implementation mission.
THE BACKGROUND OF NTIM-1

During the buildup to Operation Iraqi Freedom there was quite a bit of dissent
within the alliance, particularly from France and Germany. German Chancellor Gerhard
Schroder did not agree with the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq for a couple of reasons. First,
the United Nations weapons inspectors had not found a "smoking gun" in Iraq that would
lead him to believe that Saddam Hussein was in possession of WMDs.

Second,

Chancellor Schroder faced a populace that was adamantly against the war and since he
was up for reelection, he thought it was in his best interest to criticize the United States,
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especially President Bush, for not allowing the U.N. adequate time to conduct its
investigation. 129 France, however, was in a different position altogether in their criticism
of an attack against Iraq. First, France is a permanent member of the U.N. Security
Council and President Jacques Chirac believed that it was his duty to uphold what he
believed to be the international law of war in the decision to attack a sovereign state.
Furthermore, President Chirac believed that the Bush Administration's policy of
preemptive war was wrong and could inevitably lead to the collapse of the international
order. President Chirac, like many European leaders, also faced staunch resistance by the
French populace on the decision to go to war. 130 Unlike President Chirac and Chancellor
Schroder, most European leaders had given up hope that the only global superpower
would voluntarily restrain from attacking Iraq.
Before Operation Iraqi Freedom commenced, the United States requested from
Turkey that the United States base operations out of southeastern Turkey so that the
northern front of Iraq would be covered. The newly elected Justice and Development
Party (AKP) in Turkey were thought to be pro-American.

The United States also

believed that the AKP was becoming one of the U.S.'s most reliable allies because of
their willingness to take over command of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan in 2002.
However, this was not the case and the AKP believed it to be politically impossible to
allow U.S. troops to base operations out of Turkey in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom
on a domestic level. In the end, Turkey's governments request to its parliament to allow
U.S. troops to base operations out of Turkey fell short of the majority vote required and
was therefore defeated. 131
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Although the war in Iraq was supported by some NATO members and those
members did send forces to aid in the U.S.-led war, there was no consensus on whether or
not to go to war with Iraq. In the case of Afghanistan in 2001, NATO invoked Article 5
of the Washington Treaty to come to the United States' defense after the terrorist attacks
of 9/11. However, alliance members such as France and Germany were vocal against the
alliance's adoption of a "blank check" resolution that would enable President Bush to
utilize NATO resources as he pleased in the war on terrorism. French and German
leaders wanted to make sure that any operation that would involve NATO resources be
discussed before it was implemented. 132 Furthermore, Germany and France wanted the
United States to hold off on any military operations against Iraq in hopes that a
diplomatic compromise could be made. However, President Bush disagreed with the
advice given by two of the larger NATO allies. In a speech given March 17, 2003 to the
American people President Bush stated:
"The world has engaged in 12 years of diplomacy ... In the case of Iraq, the
Security Council did act, in the early 1990s. Under Resolutions 678 and
687 -- both still in effect -- the United States and our allies are authorized
to use force in ridding Iraq of weapons of mass destruction. For more than
a decade, the United States and other nations have pursued patient and
honorable efforts to disarm the Iraqi regime without war." 133
On January 15, 2003, the United States formally requested from the alliance a
plan that would lend various kinds of support in the event that military action occurred
against Iraq. Included in this request was the protection by NATO forces of U.S. bases in
Europe, the replacement of U.S. troops redeployed from the Balkan to Iraq and the
protection of Turkey from any attack from Iraq. Included in the request was the use of
AWACS surveillance planes, chemical-biological response units and deploying Patriot
anti-missile batteries in Turkey. 134 After three weeks of Belgium, France and Germany
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blocking any accord that would allow NATO to begin drawing up plans to determine
what contributions the alliance would provide in case of military action against Iraq,
NATO Secretary General George Robertson decided to act. On Thursday, February 6,
2003, Secretary General George Robinson invoked the "silence procedure" in hopes of
coming to a consensus on the defense of Turkey should there be a spill-over effect from
Iraq. Under the "silence procedure," the Secretary General writes to each member's
delegation and if there are no objections raised, NATO would begin military planning
automatically. 135 Germany, France and Belgium believed that the timing of the issue was
bad because they believed that there were still diplomatic routes to take in dealing with
Iraq. On Monday, February 10, 2003, France, Germany and Belgium broke that silence
procedure which blocked NATO planning for the protection of Turkey from any military
threat from Iraq in case war breaks out. 136 In response to these three countries blocking
the initiative to begin military planning to protect Turkey, the Turkish government
requested consultations within the framework of Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as
expressed in its letter of 10 February 2003, and pursuant to Article 4 of the Washington
Treaty which states:
"The Parties will consult whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the
territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties
is threatened. " 137
Despite objections by France, on February 19, 2003, NATO's Defense Planning
Committee (which excluded France) authorized the military authorities to implement
defensive measures to assist Turkey. 138

NATO implemented Operation Display

Deterrence which lasted from February to April 2003. This mission was conducted to
contribute to the defense of Turkey at the outset of the U.S. invasion of Iraq to ensure
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that a spillover effect did not occur. 139 Operation Display Deterrence provided Turkey
with A WACS surveillance aircraft, Patriot missile systems and chemical-biological
response units. Despite the lack of support from two of its major NATO allies, the
United States went ahead with the invasion of Iraq with a coalition of NATO members
and non-NATO members.
On March 19, 2003, the United States and Great Britain commenced an attack
against the Hussein-led Iraqi regime.

The attack against Saddam Hussein had eight

:.lbjectives that the U.S.-led coalition hoped to achieve. First, was to end the reign of the
Saddam Hussein led regime.
~eapons

Second, was to identify, isolate and dispose of Iraq's

of mass destruction (WMDs ). Third, was to search, root out and capture any

:errorist outlets out of the country. Fourth, was to collect intelligence related to terrorist
1etworks throughout the Middle East. Fifth, was to collect intelligence on the transfer of
N"MDs throughout the world. Sixth was to end U.N. sanctions and provide humanitarian
·esources to the Iraqi citizens. Seventh, was to secure and return Iraq's oil fields to the
raqi people. Finally, is to help secure an environment in which the Iraqi people can
.

.

mJoy a representative government.
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Although the war in Iraq was supported by some NATO members and those
nembers did send forces to aid in the U.S.-led war, there was no consensus on whether or
tot to go to war with Iraq. In the case of Afghanistan in 2001, NATO invoked Article 5
if the Washington Treaty to come to the United States' defense after the terrorist attacks
1f 9/11. However, alliance members such as France and Germany were vocal against the
lliance's adoption of a "blank check" resolution that would enable President Bush to
ltilize NATO resources as he pleased in the war on terrorism. French and German
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leaders wanted to make sure that any operation that would involve NATO resources be
discussed before it was implemented. 141 Furthermore, Germany and France wanted the
United States to hold off on any military operations against Iraq in hopes that a
diplomatic compromise could be made. However, President Bush disagreed with the
advice given by two of the larger NATO allies. In a speech given March 17, 2003 to the
American people President Bush stated:
"The world has engaged in 12 years of diplomacy .. .In the case oflraq, the
Security Council did act, in the early 1990s. Under Resolutions 678 and
687 -- both still in effect -- the United States and our allies are authorized
to use force in ridding Iraq of weapons of mass destruction. For more than
a decade, the United States and other nations have pursued patient and
honorable efforts to disarm the Iraqi regime without war." 142
Despite the lack of support from two of its major NATO allies, the United States went
ahead with the invasion of Iraq with a coalition of NATO members and non-NATO
members.
In April of 2003, the United States also asked for NATO countries to contribute to
a stabilization force that would help in keeping peace in Iraq. Again, despite objections
from France and Germany, Poland stepped forward and the North Atlantic Council
helped the Polish government in the planning and implementation of this stabilization
force. On September 3, 2003, Poland assumed command of the Multinational Division
(MND) Central South in Iraq as part of the international stabilization force. NATO has
assisted Poland in a number of ways including providing intelligence, logistics expertise,
movement co-ordination, force generation and secure communications support. 143 In
what seems like a renewed vigor in supporting the United States campaign in the war on
terror, several NATO countries contributed to the Polish-led stabilization force including
Spain who provided the Deputy Commander, while other allied contributors include
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Bulgaria, Denmark, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Romania,
Slovakia and the United States. Ukraine, a non-NATO member, was the second largest
contributor. After the implementation of this force, Secretary General George Robinson
reiterated NATO's resolve by stating:
"Together with other NATO operations in the Balkans and in Afghanistan,
the Alliance's support for Poland in Iraq demonstrates the important
contribution NATO is making to stability and crisis management and the
fight against terrorism." 144
The evidence here shows that a ma3or divide occurred between some alliance
members and others. The rift that occurred during the United States' decision to attack
Iraq also spilled over into other issues that pressed NATO.

First, the countries that

objected to the war m Iraq argued that all diplomatic measures had not yet been
attempted and NATO never endorsed the U.S.-led Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Furthermore, they believed that the United States had not found the "smoking gun" that
Saddam supposedly had WMDs.

However, this split included three of the larger and

more important members, while many allies contributed troops or support personnel to
the U.S.-led coalition. One important lesson that can be learned from the evidence found
in the background of the NTIM-I is that the United States continues its leadership
position in the post 9111 environment.

Despite some dissent amongst the allies, a

majority of the U.S. 's alliance partners took action and participated in Operation Iraqi
Freedom. 145 The United States was also important in getting the alliance to agree on the
defense of Turkey. Originally, Belgium, Germany and France opposed a measure that
would require NATO to come to Turkey's aide if they were attacked, but the United
States continued to push until the measure was passed through the Defense Planning
Committee in which Germany and Belgium agreed to the mission. 146

Belgium and
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Germany agreed to this measure only after they were assured that the allies continued "to
support efforts in the United Nations to find a peaceful solution to the crisis," and only
due to the defensive nature of the request. 147 Some members of the alliance believed that
France's defiance of Turkey's Article IV request to be the worst crises that the alliance
has faced in its 55-year history. Turkish Foreign Minister Yasar Yakis said in February
of 2003 that "if the response is not given, then the credibility of the military alliance will
collapse. If this is not done, then the credibility and deterrence of the military alliance
will come to zero." 148 In addition to getting NATO members to commit to the defense of
Turkey, the United States was also instrumental in getting member countries to pledge
troops and resources to the Polish-led Iraqi Stabilization Force.

THE CREATION OF NTIM-1
The United States, as well as Great Britain, has pushed for the alliance to take on
a greater role in postwar-Iraq. Others continued to disagree with any NATO forces in
Iraq.

German Defense Minister Peter Struck was especially opposed to a NATO

commitment in Iraq saying that NATO has no place there. In December 2003, when U.S.
Secretary of State Colin Powell urged NATO to take on a greater role in Iraq, leaders
from member countries argued that the more pressing issue of the time was Afghanistan.
Outgoing Secretary General George Robertson stated in December:
"We've not yet come to the stage of discussing whether a wider role is
appropriate for NATO in Iraq ... we are giving support to Poland, they
undoubtedly will come and report to us .... from that maybe there will be
other applications for help for individual countries or in that division ... We
have already become involved in Iraq ... There was nobody saying 'no' but
at the moment our preoccupation is with Afghanistan."
In early June 2004, President Bush asked for NATO to take on a greater role in
Iraq. At the time, sixteen NATO members had pledged troops to the U.S.-led coalition of
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the willing that undertook Operation Iraqi Freedom. "We will work with our NATO
friends to at least continue the role that now exists, and hopefully expand it somewhat,"
Bush said. French President Jacques Chirac did not believe that Iraq was NATO's place
of business stating, "It does not fit within the vocation of NATO to intervene in Iraq." 149
President Bush however never asked NATO to contribute any troops for combat, but
insisted that the alliance provide resources and personnel to train new Iraqi security and
defense forces.
At the June 2004 Istanbul Summit, French President Jacques Chirac disagreed
with President Bush's vision of NATO's role in postwar-Iraq. At this summit, the 26
members of NATO agreed to train Iraqi armed forces.

President Bush called this a

"triumph" and important to the future of the alliance, but Chirac tried to dilute Bush's
victory by saying, "I would be entirely hostile to any presence of NATO in Iraq." 150 The
divisions that began with the United States' insistence that NATO should take on a
greater role in Iraq were both military and political. The United States believed that the
training mission should be integrated into the command structure of the U.S.-led
coalition. France, however, disagreed and believed that the mission should fall only
under the command of NATO leaders.

The divisions that continued to hold-up the

mission was centered around where the training would take place, who would pay for it
and how closely it would be linked to the U.S.-led coalition. French President Jacques
Chirac suggested that the training should take place outside of Iraq. Both the French and
German governments made it clear that they would not send troops into Iraq but would
agree to train Iraqi forces outside oflraq. 151 The United States, however, believes that for
the sake of efficiency, the training mission should come under the command of the U.S.-
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led coalition. 152 In a political victory within the alliance for the United States, NATO
overcame French resistance and agreed to send a delegation to Iraq to train Iraqi
forces. 153 The core of the NATO Training Implementation Mission in Iraq (NTIM-I)
arrived in Iraq on August 14, 2004. 154
The Iraqi Intern Government asked NATO for help in implementing a training
mission that would help Iraq provide for its own security as well as bolstering new
security institutions that have been created. 155 Much like the current NATO mission in
Afghanistan, the NATO Training Implementation Mission (NTIM-I) is separate from the
United States ongoing combat operations within Iraq. The NTIM-I is involved in the
training, equipping and technical assistance of Iraqi senior security and defense officials.
Since the NTIM-I went into effect, there have been about fifty NATO officers on the
ground training Iraqi personnel, led by Dutch Major General Carel Hilderink. 156 Since its
implementation, NATO has expanded its operations by establishing an Iraqi Training,
Education and Doctrine Center where Iraqi officials will be trained by NATO officials.
This center will focus on leadership training and building a multi-ethnic security
institution in which all Iraqis will feel safer.
The Training Implementation Mission is under the political control of NATO's
North Atlantic Council (NAC) and is in coordination with the U.S.-Multinational Force
(MNF). Currently, U.S. Lieutenant General David Petraeus, commander of the U.S-led
MNF is the commander of both the MNF and the NTIM-I. On issues concerning the
NATO mission, General Petraeus reports up the chain of command to NATO' Supreme
Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) U.S. General James L. Jones who answers

82

directly to the North Atlantic Council. Under the current structure, the U.S.-led MNF
provides the security for NATO forces deployed to Iraq. 157
The creation ofNTIM-I is seen by alliance members as a benchmark for NATO to
undertake issues that are outside of the "classic" NATO sphere. 158 NATO officials also
agree that maintaining the security of the European continent means facing new threats
where they start, instead of waiting for them to come to Europe. Hence, NATO must go
"out-of-area," before these new threats come to the doorsteps of the European countries.
Politically, the alliance was also under pressure to do something in Iraq. U.S. Senators
blasted European leaders for dragging their feet in a decision to help in Iraq. Senator
Joseph Biden (D-Delaware) said in June:
"It's really time that they do step up. If we don't hand over the capacity
for this sovereign government to be secure within its own borders and to
be at peace with itself, then we're going to inherit a circumstance in Iraq
that is equally as dangerous to us" as having ousted President Saddam
Hussein. It's time for NATO, and particularly the French and Germans, to
act more responsibly now." 159
Furthermore, the dissenting NATO members said that they wanted the Iraqi interim
government to ask for help before they initiated any training mission. Iraqi interim Prime
Minister Iyad Allawi asked for help in June of 2004, but these NATO members continue
to drag their feet and object to sending troops in support of the training mission. 160
The United States again shows not only their leadership position in NATO, but
also that they are the hegemonic power in the world.

Despite staunch rejections by

France, Germany and Belgium, the United States was still able to get NATO to come to a
consensus on a training mission in Iraq. This consensus was not, however, without its
problems and the consensus decision itself has left something to be desired. Even though
the United States had the ability to gain a consensus through the alliance, most of the
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personnel that is involved in NTIM-I are from countries that had participated either in the
coalition that joined the U.S. during Operation Iraqi Freedom or have troops already
deployed there in support of the stabilization force. However, this may have come at a
great price to the alliance. Time will tell if the alliance is able to survive these turbulent
times. The evidence here suggests that this may not be the case.
THE EVOLUTION OF NTIM-1

Before the training mission was implemented, the rift between the United States
and France continued to delay a decision for NATO to undertake such a mission. The
United States wanted the NATO mission be linked to the U.S.-led coalition, but French
officials feared the move would open the door to NATO involvement in battling the
insurgency. 161 Since NATO decided to undertake the training mission in Iraq, Germany
and France have continued to object to the training of Iraqi officers in Iraq. Instead they
have insisted that, if they participate in the training mission, it should occur outside of
Iraq. 162 Neither France nor Germany has contributed any training officials to the mission
in Iraq.
At the June 2004 Istanbul Summit, NATO agreed to begin training Iraqi officials
sometime within the next couple of months. Originally, fifty-seven officials were sent to
Iraq to begin the training mission. The United States had been pressuring the alliance to
take on a greater burden in Iraq, but alliance member quelled at the notion and some
made it clear that they would not support any mission that involved a NATO flag on the
ground in Iraq. However, since the Istanbul Summit, alliance members have begun to
come together and decide to implement such a mission. By October 2004, NATO's
defense ministers agreed on a plan to speed up the deployment of 300 training officers to
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Iraq by the end of the year to help train more Iraqi officials that will be able to safeguard
the January 2005 elections. 163 A bulk of this first wave of instructors will come from the
United States, Great Britain, Denmark, and Norway. However, in late October 2004, the
rift between France and the United States resurfaced. U.S. officials believe that France,
along with Belgium, Germany and Spain, are trying to obstruct NATO's attempt to gain a
consensus on the future of Iraq. Dombey asserts that the split that occurred in 2003 has
spilled over into other areas of NATO, which has made even relatively routine decisions
require great debate and political capital. 164
As of November 19, 2004, at least six alliance members have refused to send
military instructors to train Iraqi officials in support of the Training Implementation
Mission.

Despite assurance that the NATO mission would not involve any combat

duties, France, Germany, Belgium, Spain, Luxembourg and Greece have refused to play
an active role in contributing troops to the NTIM-I mission. These same countries earlier
refused to contribute any troops to the U.S.-led coalition that overthrew Saddam Hussein.
Despite this refusal, all twenty-six allied members voted for the training program and
agreed to help fund it.

Sixteen of the alliance members agreed to either contribute

trainers, protection troops or both.

The United States will absorb the brunt of the

operation contributing most of the 400 officers as well as most of the 1,200 protection
force. 165
In sum, before, during and after the war in Iraq, NATO was divided amongst its
members creating the worst crises that the alliance has seen in its 55-year history. The
evolution of NTIM-I is yet another example of the United States contributions to the
alliance, politically and militarily. Despite the dissent of Belgium, Germany and France
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the United States was able to get NATO to implement the mission to protect Turkey, the
Polish-led stabilization force, and finally the NATO Training Implementation Mission in
Iraq. The United States worked within the alliance to build a broad coalition of support
for the mission in Iraq and eventually won approval. However, there is still animosity
that exists between some NATO members, especially the United States and France,
which could threaten the mission in Iraq.

CONCLUSION:

The United States attacked Iraq despite a growing dissent amongst it more
powerful and influential allies within NATO, showing its resolve that it does not have to
work with the alliance, especially if they wanted to avoid a central command structure
that required consensus in order to act. The United States was able to build a coalition
within a coalition of both members and non-members of NATO to support Operation
Iraqi Freedom. Despite the dissent of six allied members, the United States was still able
to get the alliance to agree to undertake a role in post-war Iraq. Both Germany and
France said that they would not support such a measure, but in the end the decision to
establish the Training Implementation Mission was made by consensus. However, the
six (France, Germany, Belgium, Spain, Luxembourg and Greece) before mentioned allies
have declined to participate in the mission. Both the United States and the Europeans had
to make concessions in order to implement this mission, but none the less the alliance
came together to take on such a mission.
After the July 2004 Istanbul Summit in an article published in the United Press
International, Andrea Riemer argued that the alliance must go "out-of-area" before the
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new security threats comes to Europe. 166 The peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan and
this training mission in Iraq are certainly steps in the right directions to keep NATO a
viable working alliance.

However, this mission more than any other has shown the

leadership and resolve of the United States in their relationship to the transatlantic
alliance.

When the United States went to war without a resolution from the United

Nations or without the complete support of NATO, it appeared that the alliance may have
been broken. Furthermore, France and Germany were adamantly against any NATO role
in postwar Iraq despite the fact that sixteen NATO members had joined the U.S.-led
alliance to expel Saddam Hussein from Iraq.
The Bush Administration did not want to use NATO's consensus-based military
command structure during Operation Iraqi Freedom so that they would be free to conduct
the operations as they pleased. However, after the operation was complete, the Bush
Administration wanted NATO to take on a role in Iraq. This is much like the ISAF
mission in Afghanistan in such a way that the United States did not use NATO's military
command structure but asked NATO to take on a post-war role in Afghanistan. Never in
its 55 year history had the alliance faced such division, but in the end, the United States
was instrumental in getting the alliance to accept the accords to protect Turkey, convince
the alliance to logistically support the Polish-led stabilization force, and help lead the
implementation of the training mission in Iraq, although at potentially a very heavy price.
NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General James Jones, has said that
he expects up to 3,000 troops to be deployed in support of the training mission in Iraq.
This is a lofty goal considering NATO is having trouble getting member countries to
commit just a fraction of this amount, and especially if four of the largest contributors to
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NATO continue to say that they will not contribute any troops under any circumstances
to the operation in Iraq (Germany, France, Belgium and Spain).

167

Considering that, as

of early October 2004, only about forty soldiers were in place in Iraq contributing to the
mission, I would say that 3,000 is an awful large number to be hoping for. 168 If this
number is ever reached, it is likely that most of these troops will be American.
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CHAPTERV
CONCLUSION
What does the evidence show about U.S./NATO relations? Furthermore, what
does this mean to the future viability and the very survival of the transatlantic alliance?
The concluding chapter will address these questions in two ways. First, a short summary
of each mission will be examined in this chapter in order to find any implications that
U.S. contributions have to the future of the transatlantic alliance. Second, I will address
how this thesis fits into the past literature pertaining to the future of NATO.
KOSOVO:
In the aftermath of Operation Allied Force, the United States and its NATO allies
agreed that NATO should provide a peacekeeping force in order to ensure the peace and
security of Kosovo. NATO created KFOR whose mission was to build an environment
in which all citizens, despite their ethnic background, could live in peace and an
environment in which democracy can begin to grow. The evidence presented in chapter
2 suggest that the United States was instrumental in the development of KFOR, and at the
outset of the mission, contributed more troops and monetary assistance than any other
ally. This mission is important because it is one of the earlier post-Cold War crises that
the alliance faced. The evidence also suggests that this mission, either be indirectly or
directly, has affected the way the United States works within and outside of the alliance
and in future endeavors. The U.S. contributions to the air war and peacekeeping mission
in Kosovo cannot be emphasized enough. Without the contributions of the United States,
it could be argued that Milosevic would not have come to the bargaining table. More
recently, the United States has begun to draw down its forces in Kosovo to support
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military action elsewhere.

President Bush has suggested that the Europeans, more

specifically the European Union, take on the burden of the peacekeeping mission in
Kosovo.
What implications do the U.S. contributions to KFOR have on the future of the
alliance? The evidence suggests that in order for the alliance to remain viable and
vibrant, the United States must continue in its leadership role because most of its
European allies lack the resources to contribute significantly militarily to future NATO
missions.

At the outset of the KFOR mission the United States was the leading

contributor, both militarily and monetarily. However, the United States has begun to
reduce its troop levels in the Balkans. This could be happening for a number of reasons,
but the evidence in this thesis suggests two. First, the United States is retreating from the
alliance and would rather work unilaterally or with a coalition that accepts being under
the command of U.S. officers. Second, it could be that the Bush Administrations foreign
policy is to work unilaterally so that it will be easier to accomplish their goals globally.
Whatever the reason, the next few years are important to the future of NATO as a viable
security alliance.
AFGHANISTAN:

After Operation Enduring Freedom, in which the United States, Great Britain and
Afghan forces (the Northern Alliance) dispelled Taliban and al-Qaeda forces from
Afghanistan, NATO took over the ISAF mission from the United Nations. ISAF's role in
Afghanistan is to help develop the conditions in Afghanistan in which it can enjoy a
representative government and a self-sustaining peace. The United States contributed
very little to the ISAF mission, instead focusing on the hunting down of remnants of the
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Taliban regime and al-Qaeda terrorist network. Initially the United States wanted to keep
the NATO mission separate from the continuing Operation Enduring Freedom. More
recently however, the United States has begun to pressure its NATO allies to combine the
ISAF mission with Operation Enduring Freedom. The United States may have asked its
allies to combine these two missions to make them more efficient, or perhaps to reduce
the number of troops that are deployed in the area of responsibility and redeploy them in
support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Whatever the reason for the United States' change
of heart, one thing is evident, and that is that the United States has begun to retreat
somewhat from the alliance in favor of unilateral action with coalitions that are willing to
work with the United States. This was evident during the initial stages of Operation
Enduring Freedom when NATO offered resources to the United States. Since the United
States did not wan the war to be conducted through NATO's military structure, the
United States instead compiled a coalition that was willing to allow the U.S. to remain in
command of all combat operations.
Also of note during Operation Enduring Freedom was the fact that the United
States did not use the resources that NATO was ready to provide. Many reasons of why
the United States would do this can be derived. However, the evidence suggests that the
United States did not want to work within the complex military structure of NATO's
consensus decision-making process.
Iraq:
After Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Iraqi Intern Government asked NATO for help
in implementing a training mission that would help Iraq provide for its own security as
well as bolster new security institutions that have been created. The NATO Training
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Implementation Mission (NTIM-1) is involved in the training, equipping and technical
assistance of Iraqi senior security and defense officials. The United States will bear the
brunt of the operation contributing most of the 400 officers as well as most of the 1,200
protection force deployed in Iraq. Even though the United States is contributing the most
to the NTIM-1 mission, it is doing so because other alliance members have refused to
contribute at all. The evidence in chapter 4 suggests that NATO is merely a vehicle for
the NTIM-1 and the rift that began when the United States commenced Operation Iraqi
Freedom is still very much alive and well. The difficulty in this mission is that unlike the
missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan, new developments occur daily in regards to
NATO's commitment to Iraq. Furthermore, U.S. commitments to the training mission in
Iraq are not what strengthens the transatlantic partnership, but instead weakens it because
some European allies will not contribute to the mission. In the end, the United States was
able to convince the alliance to implement the training mission in Iraq and is led by U.S.
Lieutenant General David Petraeus, who also commands the U.S.-led coalition still
battling insurgents in Iraq. 169
What threat?
Walt asserted that the lack of an external threat would lead to the demise of
NAT0. 170 However, the evidence in chapter 2 shows otherwise. Despite the lack of an
external threat, a decision to intervene and subsequently be involved in a peacekeeping
mission was reached by NATO. Furthermore, Waltz contends that an alliance will not
outlive the threats that it was originally created to defend against, and an alliance that
does not have a common threat there is no reason for alliance members to cooperate. 171
Again, the evidence in this thesis suggests otherwise and the alliance has outlived the
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Soviet threat allowing it to evolve in the post-Cold War era. The evidence also suggests
that Mearsheimer's argument that the Soviet Union was the glue that held NATO
together and without the Soviet Union the United States would abandon the continent
altogether appears to be incorrect. 172 To the contrary the United States was a leading
nation in the implementation of both the air war to dispel Milosevic and the subsequent
peacekeeping mission in Kosovo. Furthermore, since 9/11, terrorism has become the
external threat to alliance members. Chapter 2 does suggest that Duffield's argument that
NATO continues to be the leading security organization in Europe may be a good
assessment of NATO even in the post-9/11 environment. 173

In accordance with

Duffield's assessment of NATO in this new security environment, the evidence suggests
that it has undertaken "new activities and mission." However, the evidence in chapters
three and four suggest that these new activities and missions may be at the very heart of
the trouble that NATO faces.
Expansion:

The second wave of literature dealt mostly with the eastern expansion of the
alliance and its subsequent consequences.

Critics of NATO expansion asserted that

expansion would weaken an already fragile alliance and make decision-making more
difficult. The evidence in these cases does suggest that consensus building and decision
making in NATO may have become more difficult since its first and second round of
expansion. The United States found it very difficult to carry out the air war in Kosovo
because of the complex military structure of the alliance.

This may be the biggest

implications that this chapter suggests. Decision-making and consensus building did
become difficult, and the subsequent NATO missions under examination in this thesis
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suggest that the United States went outside of NATO's structure to avoid such problems.
When these critics of NATO expansion made the argument that consensus building
would be more difficult after the expansion of NATO, they probably did not foresee the
trouble would come from the more tested members.

The evidence also implies that

NATO's new Strategic Concept that was adopted in 1991 may not, as Brown asserts, be
the correct strategy for the future of the alliance. Brown argued that the new missions
could be highly problematic and could undermine the alliance as a whole. 174 The new
mission in Afghanistan suggests that this may be true. Even though the alliance has
expanded the mission outside of Kabul and increased the number of troops deployed in
the area, NATO has found it difficult to get alliance members to commit the necessary
troops and resources. This is the reason NATO took over the operation from the United
Nations in the first place. Although NATO has since gotten past this problem, it cannot
be mentioned enough the importance that this has to the future of the alliance. If NATO
continues along this same path, it is likely that it will lose its prestige and new leaders
(such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq) will no longer ask for NATO's assistance.
Wallander asserted that the alliance would be able to evolve and remain viable
because of its internal political structure. 175 The evidence suggests that the alliance has
been able to adapt from a collective defense alliance and has been able to implement new
peacekeeping missions.

However, it also suggests that NATO's complex consensus

decision making may be the eventual downfall of the alliance, especially in light of its
expansion eastward and the subsequent rift over Iraq.
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Post-9/11:

The evidence in this thesis suggests that during Operation Allied Force, KFOR,
Operation Enduring Freedom and ISAF there was a large gap between the United States
and its allied partners in terms of defense capabilities (including space-based
surveillance, large deck carrier operations, strategic airlift, radar-defeating stealth aircraft,
mid-altitude reconnaissance and strike capabilities during times when visibility was
reduced). Calleo asserted that the future of the alliance depends greatly on the closing of
this gap. The evidence that was presented in this thesis shows that this is not the case,
and if Calleo' s assessment of the alliance is correct, the future of the alliance is not
bright. 176 In the post-9/11 environment, in which terrorism may have become the new
external threat facing the alliance, European leaders do not feel the same imminent threat
that the United States feels. This further division is yet another reason why the United
States appears to have begun to retreat from the alliance. President Bush contended
during his 2000 presidential campaign that he wanted to reduce the number of U.S. troops
deployed to Kosovo in support of the NATO mission. Once elected, President Bush
initially backed away from this and decided that it was important to the alliance to
maintain its current capabilities.

However, the number of U.S. troops deployed in

support of KFOR has been reduced time and time again from the original commitment of
about 5,700 to about 1,000. Furthermore, since 9/11, President Bush has asked its NATO
Partners to take on a greater burden in Kosovo so that U.S. resources could be redirected
to Afghanistan and eventually Iraq. This development could be seen as both good and
had for the future of the alliance.
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Critics would argue that the United States is retreating from the European
continent. This also suggests that a strategic divergence is occurring between the United
States and Europe which may become to large too overcome. However, proponents may
argue that NATO has come to the aid of the United States by providing resources so that
the U.S. could pull troops out of Kosovo in order to deploy them elsewhere. It is difficult
to determine which of these arguments is correct. The evidence since 9/11 however
suggests that the former, not the latter, may be the answer. Still even though a division
has occurred over the United States' projecting military power in Iraq, alliance members
are still consulting with each other to determine the right course of action to be taken in
this environment.
The evidence these missions present lends credence to the claim that the alliance
may become just a shell and lack the viability that it had in the past. Although the United
States was an active member in the setup and implementation ofKFOR, the data suggests
that the United States began to withdraw from the alliance. This can be seen in chapter 3
in which the United States did not contribute much to ISAF. The lessons learned from
the Balkans quickly carried over to the new missions in Afghanistan and Iraq.
IMPLICATIONS:

The evidence in this thesis suggests that the transatlantic alliance is at a very
fragile point in its history. The Bush Administration has made it clear that they are
willing to work unilaterally or with coalition partners that accept the fact that the United
States is in charge. It is also evident that the United States would much rather keep its
own troops under the command of U.S. officers, rather than under the command of
NATO officers. From Kosovo to Afghanistan to Iraq, it is evident that the United States
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is the leader in the alliance. Despite the objections of the war in Iraq, the United States
still has been able to convince its NATO allies to participate in the training mission in
Iraq. Recent developments in Iraq show that France, Germany, Belgium, Spain, Greece
and Luxembourg have all gone along with the decision to set up NTIM-I.

These

countries have, however, made it clear that they will not permit their officers to be
stationed in Iraq. This is a disturbing development which could lead to even further
fragmentation within the alliance. NATO's top military officer, U.S. General James
Jones has said:
"It is important that once the alliance gets involved in an operation, it is
important that all allies support the operation. With nine or ten or eleven
countries in the alliance who will not send forces to Iraq to participate in
the mission, the burden falls then on the remaining fifteen or sixteen
nations or fourteen nations to shoulder that burden. I hope that it is a onetime event, because it really will be a limiting factor in the long term in
terms of generating forces and successive rotations. This is disturbing." 177

At the same time that France was deciding not to participate in the training mission,
French Foreign Minister Michel Bamier said:
"We all know what positions our different countries held in the period that
led up to the current situation developing. But today we must tum to the
future. France, and Europe, are read~ to do so. We have a collective duty
to put an end to instability in Iraq." 17
Two conclusions that have derived from the data collected in this thesis may lead
us to an answer on NATO's future.

First, it is evident that the United States is far

superior in terms of military resources and technology than its European partners. This
gap must be closed if European leaders expect to participate in NATO missions in the
same capacity that the United States does. If the gap continues to widen, why would the
United States bother with the alliance at all if it is only going to cause headaches
convincing its allies to participate in a mission?

Second, NATO must amend the
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Washington Treaty to eliminate the consensus building decision-making process. If ten
or eleven countries want to form a coalition under the NATO flag in order to implement
some type of mission, they should be able to do that. Instead the alliance could be used
for consultation for a country that makes the decision to use force. For example, in Iraq
there were about sixteen NATO members that joined the United States during Operation
Iraqi Freedom. Why should these countries be prevented from working under NATO
leadership? If members can let go of old rivalries (the rift over Iraq per se), then there is
no reason why the alliance cannot survive the post-September 11th environment.
One thing is clear, the United States continues to be the leader in NATO.
Furthermore, the data proposes that without the leadership and contributions of the
United States, the alliance would not be able to carry out the types of missions that they
currently are. I would argue that without the U.S. contributions to the alliance, NATO
may have already disbanded (especially when considering the developments in the
European Union). Additionally, without the United States, the expansion eastward may
never have happened leaving Eastern Europe prone to instability.

Smaller member

countries, particularly newer members, have begun to bandwagon with the United States
in the war on terrorism. If Germany, France and other countries continue their animosity
towards the hegemonic power, there is a chance that we could see the end of the fifty-five
year alliance. Maybe Mearsheimer, Waltz and Morganthau were right in their assessment
of alliance formation and dissolution, especially in the case of NATO. These scholars did
not put a timetable on the demise of an alliance, and perhaps it takes certain types of
crises for member countries to realize the diverging opinions of European and American
leaders in terms of the international environment and alliances.
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The evidence in this thesis suggests that Walt's balance-of-power theory of
alliance formation may be a good explanation of NATO's Future. Walt argued that the
decline of the Soviet threat would lead NATO members to devote less effort to deterring
a direct military challenge, alliance cohesion would decline and bargaining within the
alliance would become more intense. 179 States may form alliances because they do not
want others to achieve a dominant position on a global level, and NATO may have
endured for this very reason. This might be especially true if European leaders believe
that, without the framework of an alliance, the United States may become isolationists.
All of these findings are limited due to the case study approach employed. One
limitation is that the mission is Iraq is fairly new, and only time will tell if the alliance is
able to heal from the wounds that it suffered since the United States attacked Iraq.
Another limitation is that except for a brief period of time during KFOR, the Bush
Administration has been in power. Perhaps the Bush Administration differs from its
European allies in their views of the global environment. Perhaps President George W.
Bush is attempting to heal old wound within the alliance by asking for more help in Iraq
and Afghanistan. The answer to NATO's future will be played out and answered in the
next few years.
Despite these limitations, the evidence presented here suggests that the future of
NATO is still in question and the transatlantic relationship may be in dire strait. Recently
NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said that the alliance was "alive and
kicking" and "NATO is not terminally ill." 180 The evidence presented in this thesis
suggests otherwise, maybe "kicking to stay alive," is a better description. Whatever the
case, the rift that was created by the war in Iraq and the subsequent dissent within the
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alliance concerning Turkey's defense and the NITM-I is far from over. Unless the ties
are mended, the future of NATO as a "viable" and "legitimate" alliance will be in doubt.
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APPENDIX
Abbreviations
AOR
EAPC
ISAF
KFOR
MBC
MBN
MBS
MBE
MTA
NAC
NATO
NTIM-1
OSCE
PRTs
UNSCR

Area of Responsibility
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
International Security Assistance Force
The Kosovo Force
Multinational Brigade Centre
Multinational Brigade Northeast
Multinational Brigade Southwest
Multinational Brigade East
Military Technical Agreement
North Atlantic Council
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NATO Training Implementation Mission-Iraq
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Provincial Reconstruction Teams
United Nations Security Council Resolution
Agreements and Definitions

Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council CEAPC)-this is a forum in which NATO member and
partner (non-NATO members) countries discuss political and security-related issues and
develop cooperation in a wide range of areas.
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF}-was established to help develop
conditions in Afghanistan where it can enjoy a representative government and a selfsustaining peace.
Military Technical Agreement-was an agreement between the International Security
Force ("KFOR") and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the
Republic of Serbia.
NATO Training Implementation Mission in Iraq (NTIM-I}-the purpose of the training
mission is to train, equip and provide technical assistance to Iraqi senior security and
defense officials.
North Atlantic Council (NAC)-the North Atlantic Council is the most important
decision-making body within NATO. It brings together high-level representatives of each
member country to discuss policy or operational questions requiring collective decisions.
In sum, it provides a forum for wide-ranging consultation between members on all issues
affecting their security.
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Operation Allied Force- by use of air strikes, the military objective was to degrade and
damage the military and security structure that President Milosevic (Yugoslav President)
had used to depopulate and destroy the Albanian majority in Kosovo. This was a NATO
mission, under the command of NATO.
Operation Display Deterrence-the aim of this mission was to contribute to the defense
of Turkey, in accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty, the founding basis of the
Alliance in case of an attack by Iraq.
Operation Enduring Freedom-a U.S.-led coalition attack against Taliban and al-Qaeda
forces in Afghanistan. Although NATO implemented Article 5 of the Washington
Treaty, this was not a NATO operation. It was however mandated by NATO and the
United Nations.

Operation Iraqi Freedom-was a U.S.-led coalition attack against Saddam Hussein's
regime in Iraq to dispose of the Iraqi leader. This was not a NATO mission and was not
mandated by either NATO or the United Nations.
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)-this organization
provides for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict
rehabilitation in Europe.
Rambouillet Accords-are a 3-year interim agreement that will provide democratic selfgovemment, peace, and security for everyone living in Kosovo.
The Kosovo Force (KFOR)-mission was to build an environment in which all citizens
can live in peace and democracy can begin to grow.
Washington Treaty-the founding charter of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
signed on April 3, 1949.
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